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"They that can give up essential liberty to obtain a little
temporary safety deserve neither liberty nor safety."'
I. INTRODUCTION
The rapid rise of the Intemet2 as a vital communications
network has impacted our lives in many ways. Among the changes
the Internet has brought about is the effect it has had on our personal
privacy and security. As we now use the Internet to transmit
confidential information and store personal records, the need to
protect private data has greatly increased. 3 It is now possible to
purchase merchandise from electronic stores, 4 transfer money
between bank accounts,' and even order a pizza6 while surfing the
Internet. However, the lack of encryption technology to protect
1. Attributed to Benjamin Franklin. FAMIuAR QUOTATIONS 310 (J. Bartlett ed., 16th
ed. 1992).
2. The Internet is a worldwide network which interconnects innumerable smaller
groups of linked computer networks. ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 830 (E.D. Pa. 1996).
See infra Part II.A (explaining the background of the Internet).
3. See Joel R. Reidenberg and Francoise Gamet-Pol, The Fundamental Role of Privacy
and Confidence in the Network, 30 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 105 (1995).
4. See, e.g., <http://www.unitedmedia.com/comics/dilbert/store/>.
5. See, e.g., <http://banking.wellsfargo.com/common/html/wibdise.html>.
6. See, e.g., <http://www.PizzaNet.Net/>.
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sensitive information from data thieves as it travels the Internet has
severely hampered the ability to effectively communicate over the
Internet. Recent press reports regarding security flaws in the Internet
have publicized this issue and have pointed out that the commercial
Internet is still too new to have adequate security for everyone's
needs. 7 Businesses stand ready to capitalize on the potential of the
Internet but are deterred by the lack of adequate Internet security.8
Companies fear the problems that could arise if confidential
information, such as credit card numbers, medical records, or other
sensitive information, were stolen by a computer criminal.9
Encryption technology has emerged as a solution to many of the
security problems the current Internet faces. Unfortunately,
technology also has its disadvantages. Due to the power of modem
encryption to create unbreakable messages10 and the potentially
disastrous results if such technology were used by criminals,"
encryption technology compels policy makers to trade off between
public safety and the freedom to communicate. Under current law,
the government has chosen to tip the scale towards restricting
encryption technology. 12 The United States has several long-standing
laws and policies designed to prevent "strong"' 3 encryption from
spreading abroad.14 Although these laws may have served to slow the
spread of strong encryption, they have failed to stop it."5 However,
recent government actions suggest that these restrictions may start to
loosen as politicians become aware of the problems with current U.S.
policy. 16
While it is currently possible to transmit e-mail data securely, 17
most techniques are complicated and impractical for other types of
7. Elizabeth Corcoran, Hackers Strike at N.Y. Internet Access Company, WASH. POST,
Sept. 12, 1996, at D9.
8. From Wire Reports, Net Security is a Real Issue with Companies, SAN DmO UNION-
TRIBuNE, May 14, 1996, at 17, 18.
9. Id.
10. See infra Part lII.C.5.
11. See infra Parts V. VII.B.
12. See infra Part V.C.
13. See infra Part III.C.5 (defining strong encryption).
14. See infra Part IW.A.
15. See infra Part V.A.1.
16. See infra Part IV.D.
17. PGP (Pretty Good Privacy) is probably the most commonly used encryption system
for securely sending e-mail across the Internet. See infra Part III.C.3 (background information
on RSA, a public key encryption algorithm on which PGP is based).
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data.' 8 As a whole, the Internet has a number of root security
problems and lacks effective built-in privacy and authentication' 9
mechanisms.20 One answer to solving these fundamental problems
requires modifying the very "language" that computers on the
Internet use to communicate with each other. This language, or
protocol, is called "IP," or Internet Protocol. For a variety of
reasons,2' IPng - short for IP next generation - will be the future
version of IP used on the Internet, and will provide support for
authentication, data integrity, 2 and confidentiality.2 IPng, by virtue
of its built-in security features, will enable transparent data
authentication and privacy to all end users.24 This inherent security
will have an enormous impact on the ability to enforce the law in
cyberspace. Old problems will disappear,21 but new rules may be
needed as new problems arise.26
This comment will address the issue of the future of Internet
security through IPng and other new security measures, and the
impact these new technologies will have on computer crime and
privacy. Part II briefly explains the background of the Intemet.27 Part
III covers important Internet security concepts,28 problems arising
from the lack of security,29 existing security solutions, 30 and technical
reasons why security is still a problem.3' Part IV discusses the legal
reasons why security is still a problem: domestic controls on
18. For example, audio/video data generated by desktop videoconferencing across the
Internet.
19. Authentication encompasses two properties: (1) that received data is identical to the
data that was sent, and (2) that the purported sender is the actual sender. R. Atkinson, Security
Architecture for the Internet Protocol 1, REQUEST FOR COMMENT (RFC) 1825, Aug. 1995
[hereinafter Atkinson].
20. Robert M. Hinden, IP Next Generation Overview (visited May 14, 1995)
<http:lplayground.sun.comlpub/ipng/htmlIINET-IPng-Paper.html>.
21. Not the least of which is the fact that the current version of IP used on the Internet is
running out of address space. See infra Part VI.A.
22. "Data integrity" is the property of ensuring that data is transmitted from source to
destination without undetected alteration. Atkinson, supra note 18, at 1.
23. "Confidentiality" is the property of communicating such that the intended recipients
know what was sent but unintended parties cannot determine what was sent. Id.
24. Hinden, supra note 20.
25. See infra Part VII.A.
26. See infra Parts VII.B-C.
27. See infra Part II.A.
28. See infra Part III.A.
29. See infra Part III.B.
30. See infra Part III.C.
31. See infra Part III.D.
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encryption technology,32 the U.S. government's "Clipper Chip, '33
export controls on encryption technology,34 and proposed pro-
encryption legislation.35 Part V describes some current legal issues
which turn on security issues,36 including copyright infringement,
invasion of privacy, and defamation. Part VI is a thorough
discussion of the future of Internet security, including IPng,37 and a
summary of other future security standards for the Internet.38 Finally,
Part VII is an analysis of the legal issues that this new technology
resolves, as well as those it creates.39 Part VII also discusses the
potential legal issues that will arise with the use of IPng and
encryption technology and provides an analysis of the good and bad
results of a future secure Internet.4°
The inherent security that IPng will bring to the Internet will
have a greater effect on some legal areas than on others, but its
consequences will resonate throughout the Internet and the world we
live in.
II. THE INTERNET
The Internet is the network of computer networks. Its nature
makes it difficult to determine its size at a given moment in time.41
This, and the Internet's complexity, makes it difficult to comprehend.
The best way to begin to understand the Internet is to study its origin.
The Internet traces its roots to the Defense Department's
Advanced Research Projects Agency's (ARPA) research on
networking in 1969.42 Under a program called ARPANET
(Advanced Research Projects Agency Network), a network of
interlinking computer systems was devised. 43
ARPANET removed the need for a centralized computer by
32. See infra Part IV.B.
33. See infra Part IV.C.
34. See infra Part IV.A.
35. See infra Part IV.D.
36. See infra Part V.
37. See infra Part V.
38. See infra Part VI.E.
39. See infra Part VII.
40. See infra Part VII.
41. ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824,831 (E.D. Pa. 1996).
42. Id.
43. A primary goal of the project was to design a communications system was redundant
and robust enough to continue to function even if a portion of it was rendered inoperable
because of a nuclear war.
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creating a network in which data could be routed from source to
destination through any computer on the network. 4 Instead of
downing the entire system, the loss of any computer on the network
merely required re-routing the connection to a different computer to
bridge the gap.45 What today's Internet has inherited from these
beginnings is an architecture whereby information is transmitted by
being bundled into discrete "packets," each of which is routed from
source to destination independently. Each of these packets contain
information which allows it to be routed to its destination and
recombined with other packets by the destination computer to
reconstruct the entire transmission.
While the Internet has undergone a lengthy evolution,46 it is
important to note that no single entity, academic, corporate,
government, or non-profit, administers the Internet.47 It functions in
a way that manifests the fact that hundreds of thousands of separate
computer operators of computer networks independently decided to
use common data transfer protocols to be able to communicate with
each other.48 There is no centralized storage location, control point,
or communications channel for the Internet, and it would not be
technically feasible for a single entity to control all of the
information transmitted on the Internet.49
44. Prior computer systems relied on one central computer hub to transmit messages
between various remote terminals. Thus, if this main hub were to become inoperable, the
connecting terminals would also cease to function.
45. The network was designed with redundant connections between computers so that if
one connection failed, another connection between two computers would automatically be
made using a different path to establish the connection.
46. As ARPANET was maturing, other networks, such as BITNET and USENET, were
forming between universities and research facilities around the world. Eventually, the various
networks were all linked together and now form what is known as the Interet. ACLU v. Reno,
929 F. Supp. 832. The Interet has experienced extremely rapid growth in recent years. In
1981, fewer than 300 computers were linked to the Interet, and by 1989, the number stood at
fewer than 90,000 computers. Id. at 831. By 1993, over 1,000,000 computers were connected
to the Internet. Id. Today, over 9,400,000 computers worldwide, of which approximately
sixty percent are located within the United States, are estimated to be linked to the Interet. Id.
This does not include the personal computers used by individuals to access the Internet by
modem. In all, it is estimated that there are as many as 40 million people around the world
who can, and do, access the Internet. That figure is expected to grow to 200 million users by
1999. Id. See also Richard A. Homing, Has HAL Signed a Contract, 12 SANTA CLARA
COMPETER& HIGH TECH. L.L 253, 254 n.1 (1996) (describing history of the Internet).
47. ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 832.
48. Id.
49. Id.
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mI. A SECURITY PRIMER
here may be several ievels of security involved in a typical
computer network. At the most basic level, there are passwords used
to boot-up the computer and access a local network server.50 Once on
the local network, a network administrator can restrict access to
resources by granting a user limited access "rights." It is the remote
access of a local network from outside- the physical location of the
network that usually poses the highest security 'risk.5 For this
reason, some institutions concerned with security, such as the
government, choose not to have their local network accessible from
outside the physical location.52 Some companies, while not providing
Internet access, allow remote users to communicate with the local
network through dial-in servers. These dial-in servers allow a user to
call in from outside the office via modem and access a local network.
The need for effective security here is very important because the
dial-in servers represent the front door to the entire local network.
Because of this security risk, most dial-in servers perform a dial-back
function, 3 along with several layers of password protection. These
basic procedures can provide a minimum level of security to prevent
unauthorized access to a local network.
For those companies that do provide access to the Internet, a
common security device is a "firewall. '5 4 A network-level firewall,
or packet55 filter, examines data traffic as it attempts to pass between
50. For more information on common network configurations, see Diane W. Savage,
Law of the LAN, 9 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 193 (1993).
51. Computer break-ins from outsiders are much more common than inside jobs. See
infra Part III.B.
52. Except for certain publicly accessible Internet sites, e.g.,
<http:/www.whitehouse.gov>, most government networks have very tight security for
national security reasons.
53. A "dial-back" function is where after the user calls in and makes a connection, the
server automatically hangs up, and then dials the user back at a pre-determined number.
54. Anne Knowles, Risky Business, PC WEEK, Oct. 9, 1995, at 19-20. A firewall is a
system or combination of systems that enforce a boundary between two or more networks
(e.g., between the Internet and the local network). Intranets, or private networks that use
Internet software and standards, are becoming popular with corporations that allow them to
create local networks that provide much of the benefit of the Internet, but with much greater
security and control. See Leon Erlanger, The Web-Within, PC MAG., Apr. 23, 1996, at 101.
55. A packet is the unit of data sent across a network. "Packet" is a generic term used to
describe a unit of data at any layer of the OSI (Open Systems Interconnection) protocol stack,
see infra note 277, but it is most correctly used to describe application layer data units.
Savage, supra note 50, at 200. A datagram is a self-contained, independent entity of data
carrying sufficient information to be routed from the source computer to the destination
computer without reliance on earlier exchanges between this source and destination computer
and the transporting network. Id. at 197. Note that the terms "datagram" and "packet" are
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the local network and the Internet.5 6 It filters out the packets that are
coming from an "unsecure" machine (most likely a computer that is
not owned by the company or not authorized to have access to the
local network). An application-level firewall examines traffic at the
application level-for example, FTP,57 e-mail, or telnet.58 With the
use of firewalls by almost every company attached to the Internet, the
frequency of unauthorized break-ins has declined dramatically.5 9
Along with these more traditional forms of security, security on the
Internet has taken on a whole new direction because of relatively
recent developments in encryption technology.
Cryptography, the practice and study of encryption, has a long
history.60 It was used extensively in World War II, most notably by
the famous German Enigma encryption machine.6  Today,
encryption is used by a wide variety of computer programs to protect
data from prying eyes. 62 Cryptography is used at all levels of
interaction with computers - from encrypting the password used to
login to a mainframe computer to encrypting a spreadsheet to protect
sensitive financial data.
A. Important Concepts
Security on the Internet, as on any computer network, contains
two key aspects: data authentication and data privacy. Data
authentication, which can be difficult to accomplish today,63 is the
ability to determine the true sender of the information received. Data
privacy deals with the issues of data integrity6 and data
confidentiality, which can be handled by data encryption techniques
commonly used interchangeably (in most cases, a packet simply contains a datagram).
However, technically, datagram is the right word to use when describing IPng.
56. Savage, supra note 50, at 200.
57. FTP is a client-server protocol which allows a user on one computer to transfer files
to and from another computer the Internet.
58. Telnet is the Internet standard protocol used to allow a user to log into a remote
computer over the Internet.
59. Knowles, supra note 54.
60. DAVID KAHN, THE CODEBREAKERS, ix, xii (1967).
61. Id.at420-21.
62. E.g., the popular Web browser, Netscape Navigator uses encryption to secure certain
transmissions.
63. Data authentication, while not impossible, is complicated today because of the lack
of pervasive, mandatory technology standards. One of the great strengths of lPng is that it will
provide a worldwide standard. See infra Part VI.B.
64. Data integrity is an important component in both data authentication and data
privacy. Without data integrity, both the true sender (authentication) and any confidential
information sent (privacy) is suspect.
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or by filtering out unidentifiable sources of data on a local network
(e.g., with a firewall). While data encryption is in use today, it is
complicated to use and is not inherent in normal data transmissions. 6
Currently, there are several evolving encryption standards, the
majority of which do not work on non-e-mail data. In addition, it is
illegal to export most forms of "strong" (considered unbreakable)
data encryption outside the United States. 66
An encryption algorithm (also called a cipher) transforms data
into a form unreadable without a decryption key. The decryption key
is used to convert the encrypted data (also called ciphertext) back
into readable data (also called cleartext or plaintext). Its purpose is
to ensure privacy by keeping the information hidden from anyone for
whom it is not intended, even those who can see the encrypted data.
Usually, lengthening the decryption key (by increasing the number of
bits67 used in the key) also increases the difficulty of breaking the
code. For example, encryption using a 64-bit key is considered to be
more secure than encryption using a 40-bit key. Note that adding one
bit to the length of the key doubles the number of possible keys. 68
B. Problems Arising from a Lack of Security
Today, even the most security-savvy company has to beware. In
a series of computer security breaches, Citibank's payment system
was compromised for more than $10 million, although the bank said
that it eventually recovered most of the loss. 69 Citibank is not the
only bank to suffer from electronic burglary. It has been estimated
that in just two months in 1995, about $300 million electronically
disappeared from U.S. banks.70 In addition, an Internet standards
leader, Netscape Communications Corp., had to issue an emergency
65. The most common data encryption program, PGP, is not particularly user-friendly,
and its use is not widespread among Internet users as a whole. See infra Part III.D.
66. See infra Part IV.D.
67. A bit, short for binary digit, is how computers represent information. A bit is either a
zero or a one. While humans typically count relative to the number 10, computers only use
zeros and ones. In the encryption context, the number of bits used to represent a piece of
information is used to refer to how large that piece of information is. Thus, an encryption key
with a greater number of bits means it can be longer and potentially contain more possible
"combinations" in which the right one "unlocks" the encrypted information.
68. To see this, consider number of possible keys represented by 63 bits, and then see
that an additional 64th bit can be either zero or one. Thus, the number of 64-bit keys is twice
the number of 63-bit keys - all of the ones where the 64th bit is a zero plus all of the ones
where the 64th bit is a one. Running this logic the other way shows that the number of
possible n bit keys is 2'.
69. Udo Flohr, Bank Robbers Go Electric, BYTE, Nov. 1995, at 48.
70. Id.
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patch for its popular Navigator World Wide Web browser, after two
college students discovered a security hole in the software.71
According to investigators of the Senate's Permanent Investigations
Subcommittee, hackers cost businesses worldwide an estimated $800
million in 1995 through breaking into computer systems at banks,
hospitals, and other large businesses. 72 Despite this, it is rare for
businesses to report security breaches, possibly out of a fear that
negative publicity would scare off potential investors.73
Security problems such as e-mail tampering, IP spoofing,74 and
other system break-ins are not uncommon computer network attacks
today.75 In 1994, Carnegie Mellon University's famed CERT
(Computer Emergency Response Team) received 29,580 e-mail
messages and 3,664 hot-line calls reporting computer security
incidents or requesting information on how to make networks more
secure. The staff handled 2,241 computer security incidents affecting
40,241 sites.76
Even the government is not safe from computer hackers.
Recently, government investigators from the General Accounting
Office warned that the Pentagon suffered as many as 250,000
"attacks" on its computers in 1995. 77 Even more worrisome is the
report's suggestion that about 65 percent of those break-in attempts
were successful. The report detailed several recent attacks on the
Pentagon's computer systems, including a 1994 incident in which
two hackers were able to gain complete access to computers
containing information relating to classified weapons systems. 78
The lack of encryption inhibits development of commerce over
the Internet. Without a secure way to conduct transactions,
companies are reluctant to begin to transact business on the
Interet.79 It also affects personal interaction. Sending someone an
71. Knowles, supra note 54.
72. John J. Fialka, Intrusions by Computer Hackers Cost Big Business $800 Million in
1995, WALL ST. J., June 6, 1996, B13 Western Edition.
73. Id.
74. IP spoofing is a network attack whereby an outside computer attempts to illicitly
impersonate a trusted computer by pretending it is the trustworthy computer (by using its IP
network address). Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT), IP Spoofing Attacks and
Hiacked Terminal Connections, CERT ADVISORY, Jan. 23, 1995.
75. Id.
76. Knowles, supra note 54.
77. Philip Shenon, Report Warns of Security Threats Posed by Computer Hackers, N.Y.
TIMES, May 23, 1996.
78. Id.
79. From Wire Reports, supra note 8.
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e-mail message over the Internet without any encryption is akin to
mailing them a postcard. Without encryption, a third-party computer
operator can read the information in an e-mail message just as
easily80 as the mailman can read your postcard. Encryption has
become so crucial to privacy that some people even owe their lives to
the use of encryption.81
C. Existing Security Solutions
The following sections discuss encryption technologies that are
basic to Internet security. A familiarity with these technologies is
central to understanding how Internet security works today and how
it will change in the future once these technologies and their variants
become widespread.
1. Secret Key Encryption
As the name suggests, secret key encryption relies upon a key
which must remain secret in order to securely transmit data. It is the
most fundamental encryption methodology. When someone wishes
to send a secure message to another party, the sender encrypts the
message using a particular key. The recipient then decrypts the
message with the same key. The key must remain secret, because
anyone intercepting the message could decrypt it if they have the
secret key. However, there must be some communication of the key
between the sender and recipient in order to allow the recipient to
decrypt the message with the correct key.
There are many different secret key cryptosystems. DES82 (data
80. It should be noted that when an e-mail message is sent across the Internet, the
message does not go directly from the sender's computer to the recipient's computer. The
message makes several stops at intermediate systems along the way. Without encryption it is
extremely easy for the operator of one of these intermediate systems to read any message that
passes through his system on its way to its final destination.
81. It has been rumored that some human-rights organizations in Eastern Europe and
Asia use encryption to protect member lists and other sensitive information that might cost
people their lives if the information was made known to the police.
82. DES was defined and endorsed by the U.S. government in 1977 as an official
standard. RSA LABORATORIES, ANSWERS To FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS ABOUT
TODAY'S CRYPTOGRAPHY, version 3.0 (1996), at 69. The DES specifications can be found in
the official FIPS (Federal Information Processing Standards) publication. National Institute of
Standards and Technology, Data Encryption Standard, FIPS PUBLICATION 46-1 (Jan. 22,
1988). Since it was originally developed at IBM, DES has been subject to intense scrutiny
over the last nineteen years and is the most well known and widely used cryptosystem in the
world. RSA LABORATORIES at 69. The National Institute of Standards and Technologies
(NIST) has recertified DES as an official U.S. government encryption standard every five
years; DES was last recertified in 1993 (by default). Id. However, the NIST has indicated
1997]
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encryption standard) is the most common, and its features are
representative of the issues generally involved.
DES is a secret (also called private) key, symmetric (both keys
are the same) cryptosystem that operates on 64-bit blocks of data
with a 56-bit key.83 When used for communication, both sender and
receiver must know the same secret key that is used both to encrypt
and decrypt the message.14 DES can also be used to encrypt files
stored on a hard drive. Because DES uses a single private key,
secure key distribution may be difficult in a multi-user
environment. 5 DES has a number of benefits. It was designed to be
implemented in hardware, and its operation is relatively fast. DES is
also very good at encrypting a large set of data (also called bulk
encryption). However, since standard DES operates with only a 56-
bit key and is symmetrical, it is considered to be relatively "weak"
encryption. "Weak" encryption is breakable at the current level of
technology, given a reasonable amount of time and computing
resources.86 A more recent variant of DES, Triple DES (which
actually uses 112-bit keys), is considered to be "strong" encryption.
Strong encryption is thought to be unbreakable with present
technology.87
The U.S. government strictly regulates the export of DES, either
in hardware or software."8 The government rarely approves the
export of DES, despite its wide availability overseas. Only financial
institutions and foreign subsidiaries of U.S. companies are able to get
exceptions to the export regulations. 89
Other secret key ciphers include RM2 (a block cipher designed
as a direct replacement for DES),90 RC4 (a stream cipher9' used by
that it may not recertify DES again. Id.
83. RSA LABORATORIES, supra note 82.
84. The symmetric nature of DES means that the same private key is used to both
encrypt and decrypt the data. If the private key is compromised, anyone using that key could
decrypt any data encrypted using that key.
85. The fact that it is difficult to securely distribute a single private key (it is hard to
keep anything secret when many people know it) was one of the main reasons why public key
encryption, see infra Part III.C.2., was invented.
86. See infra Part III.C.5 for information on what is considered "weak" encryption.
87. See infra Part 11I.C.5 for information on what is considered "strong" encryption.
88. International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR), 22 C.F.R. §§ 120-130 (1995). See
infra Part IV.A.1 for more information on export controls on encryption technology..
89. RSA DATA SECURITY, INC., ANSWERS TO FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS ABOUT
CRYPTOGRAPHY EXPORT LAWS 10 (1996).
90. RSA LABORATORIES, supra note 82, at 78.
91. A stream cipher is a symmetric encryption algorithm. Stream ciphers can be
designed to be very fast, much faster than any block cipher (like DES). While block ciphers
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the popular World Wide Web browser Netscape Navigator),92 RC5 (a
common fast block cipher),93 and Blowfish (a block cipher used in
PGPfone, a derivative of PGP94  used to encrypt voice
communications). 95 These algorithms are more flexible than DES
and allow for greater key sizes (up to 2048-bit keys in RC5).9 6
2. Public Key Encryption97
The problem inherent in secret key cryptography is that the key
must remain secret. Two people wanting to use secret key encryption
have to agree on the secret key they would use to encrypt messages
before they can begin secure communications. Thus, the security of
a single key cipher disappears as soon as the key is compromised. A
stolen key could be used by a third party to alter messages, or send
fake messages to the unsuspecting parties.
The solution to the key security problem is in public key
cryptography.98 In a public key system, all users create their own
public key, which is freely available to all, and a private key, which
must be secret. The key to understanding public key encryption is
this - messages encrypted with the private key can be decrypted
only with the public key, and messages encrypted with the public key
can be decrypted only with the private key. The following is an
example of how this process would occur: suppose Lauren wants to
send a confidential e-mail message to Trevor. First, Lauren and
Trevor would openly exchange their public keys via their normal e-
mail programs (remember, the public keys are supposed to be public,
i.e., freely available to all, and thus do not have to be exchanged in
secret). Then, Lauren would enter her plaintext message and
Trevor's public key into her public key encryption software. The
encryption software takes those two inputs and in turn outputs the
ciphertext, which looks like unintelligible data. Lauren then uses her
operate on large blocks of text, stream ciphers typically operate on smaller units of plaintext,
usually the individual bits of the plaintext. Id. at 91.
92. Id. at 92.
93. Id. at 79.
94. See infra Part III.C.2 (for more information on PGP).
95. RSA LABORATORIES, supra note 82, at 84.
96. Id. at 79.
97. Public key encryption was invented in 1976 by Whitfield Diffie and Martin Hellman.
RSA LABORATORIES, supra note 82, at 22.
98. A. Michael Froomkin, The Metaphor is the Key: Cryptography, the Clipper Chip,
and the Constitution, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 709, 890 (1995). The most widely used form of
public key cryptography is Pretty Good Privacy (PGP). PHILIP R. ZIMMERMANN, PGP USER'S
GumE (1994).
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e-mail software to send Trevor the output of the encryption software.
When Trevor receives the ciphertext e-mail message, he enters both
it and his private key into his public key encryption program, which
then outputs Lauren's plaintext.
One very useful property of public key encryption is that a third
party's possession of Lauren's public key and full knowledge of the
encryption algorithm used by the public key encryption software
does not greatly help that third party in figuring out Lauren's private
key or reading her messages.99 Thus, it is easy to establish a secure
line of communication with anyone who is capable of implementing
the agreed upon public key encryption algorithm. This eliminates the
requirement of a secure way to arrange a shared key. If Lauren
wishes to communicate with Trevor, someone with whom she has
never communicated before, Lauren and Trevor can exchange the
plaintext of their public keys openly or look each other up in a freely
accessible directory of public keys. As long as they keep their
individual private keys secret, Lauren and Trevor can communicate
with each other by encrypting their outgoing messages with the
other's public key and decrypting their received messages with their
own private key.100
99. Froomkin, supra note 98, at 891. Note, however, that it is a different, and typically
harder, problem to solve if the third party just has the ciphertext alone.
100. In order to guarantee that the intended recipient of the secret message is really who
they say they are, Trevor also needs a reliable way of getting Lauren's public key. Key servers
provide a simple way of making public keys generally available. Id. at 893. A key server
utilizes what is known as a "white pages" approach to public key management. Trevor looks
up Lauren's name on the key server's directory of public keys, and finds Lauren's public key
(assuming, of course, that she registered it). Because public key encryption depends on
knowing the recipient's public key, effective key management is likely to be an essential
element of the secure Internet, and there have been proposals to extend the Domain Name
System (DNS) to incorporate secure key server functionality. The proposed extensions to the
DNS provide these services through the use of digital signatures. These extensions will
provide for the storage of authenticated public keys in the DNS. This storage of keys will
support general public key distribution as well as DNS security. See infra Part III.C.4 (for
information on digital signatures).
Current key servers generally work on the certification authority principle. Froomkin,
supra note 98, at 894. Under this scheme, a large central body authenticates the identity of
each registrant when their public key is recorded. For example, the U.S. Post Office has
proposed that it act as a certifying authority. Id. Lauren could identify herself to the Post
Office by providing identification similar to that currently required to get a passport. The Post
Office would then add her key to its "white pages" listing on its server, and possibly provide
Lauren with a copy of her public key signed with a digital signature, described infra Part
III.C.4, with the Post Office's public key. See OTA-TCT-606, OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY
ASSESSMENT, CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES, INFORMATION SECURITY AND PRIVACY IN
NETWORK ENVIRONMENTS, 55-56 (1994).
A different principle is used in a web-of-trust system. In contrast to the certification
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3. RSA
The most widely used public key encryption algorithm is RSA.
RSA is a patented101 public key cryptosystem that provides
encryption and authentication functionality for public key encryption
systems. 02 RSA was invented in 1977 by Ron Rivest, Adi Shamir,
and Leonard Adleman.103 RSA has become an important part of
encryption technology, supplanting DES as the encryption algorithm
of choice in many situations.1 4 - Its asymmetric nature guarantees
non-repudiation 05 when used for data authentication. It is used by
most software companies implementing strong data security.106
The mathematics behind RSA, which are based on the
assumption that factoring very large numbers is difficult, are
complicated but logically interesting. 107 Simply put, RSA is based on
authority scheme, there is no central authority for web-of-trust systems: Lauren can upload a
key to various key servers at anytime. Froomkin, supra note 98, at 894. However, because
there is no verifying administrator, in order to prove that the key purporting to be "Lauren's" is
actually hers, Lauren must find other persons to "sign" her key (with a digital signature
described infra Part III.C.4) by authenticating her key with their private keys. This is usually
done by meeting personally with other people, showing proper identification, and then
exchanging public keys. For example, if Lauren has her key signed by Carol, whom Trevor
knows or trusts, Trevor can reasonably assume that the signature claiming to be from "Lauren"
is authentic. A more complex problem arises when Lauren and Trevor do not have any friends
in common. In this case, assume the following: Trevor's friend Carol signs Brian's key, and
Brian signs Lauren's key. From Trevor's standpoint, this is not as good as if Carol, whom he
knows, signs Lauren's key, but it is considerably better than nothing at all. In this type of
scenario, Trevor needs to decide how many intermediate friends he is willing to accept before
he considers a public key reliable. From Trevor's point of view, the increase in the length of
each chain of authentication can be mitigated by finding multiple such paths to Lauren. For
example, four relatively long but independent chains of authentication may be better then one
short but possibly suspect link. This web-of-trust approach is the foundation of the key
management system used in the PGP encryption system. ZIMMERMANN, supra note 98.
101. U.S. Pat. No. 4,405,829.
102. See supra Part III.C.2 (explaining the features and operation of a public key
cryptosystem).
103. R. L. Rivest et al., A Method for Obtaining Digital Signatures and Public Key
Cryptosyst ems, COMMs. ACM, Feb. 1978, at 120-26.
104. For example, in public key encryption systems like PGP, see supra Part III.C.2.
RSA LABORATORIES, supra note 82, at 35. However, RSA is patented and must be licensed,
while DES is in the public domain.
105. Non-repudiation is the property of a recipient being able to prove that the sender of
data did in fact send the data even though the sender might later desire to deny ever having
sent that data. Atkinson, supra note 19, at 2.
106. RSA LABoRAToRIEs, supra note 82, at 35. Perhaps RSA has become even a little
too widespread. See infra note 149 and accompanying text for an extremely compact
implementation of RSA that is able to be easily disseminated.
107. RSA works as follows: take two large primes, p and q, and find their product n =pq;
n is called the modulus. Choose a number, e, less than n and relatively prime to (p-1)(q-1),
and find its inverse, d mod (p-1)(q-l), which means that ed = 1 mod (p-1)(q-l); e and d are
232 COMPUTER & IHGHTECJNOLOGYL4WJOURTAL [Vol. 13
what is known as a mathematical "one-way function."1 08 A one-way
function is something that is easier to do than undo. In this case, the
one-way function is that it is much easier to compute the product of
two very large prime numbers 09 than it is to factor the product.
Given a large enough number, encryption using this technique has
been unbreakable with today's technology1
RSA uses two different but related (asymmetric) keys."' The
public enciphering key is based on the product of two huge prime
numbers, whereas the private deciphering key is based on the primes
themselves. A new pair of unique keys can be created quickly,
because it is easy to generate two large prime numbers and multiply
them together. The enciphering key thus created can be made public
without appreciable risk because of the difficulty of factoring it to
obtain the deciphering key.
Unlike DES, with RSA, encryption and authentication take place
without any sharing of private keys - each person uses only others'
public keys and his or her own private key.112 Anyone can send an
encrypted message or verify a signed message,113 using only public
keys, but only someone in possession of the correct private key can
decrypt or sign a message.
One drawback to RSA is its speed. By comparison, DES is
much faster than RSA. In software, DES is generally at least 100
called the public and private exponents, respectively. The public key is the pair (n,e); the
private key is d. The factorsp and q must be kept secret or destroyed.
It is difficult to obtain the private key d from the public key (n,e). If one could factor n
into p and q, however, then one could obtain the private key d. Thus, the entire security of
RSA is predicated on the assumption that factoring is difficult; an easy factoring method
would "break" RSA.
In practice, this is how RSA encryption works: suppose Lauren wants to send a private
message, m, to Trevor. Lauren creates the ciphertext c by exponentiating: c = m' mod n, where
e and n are Trevor's public key. To decrypt, Trevor also exponentiates: m = cd mod n, and
recovers the original message m; the relationship between e and d ensures that Trevor correctly
recovers m. Since only Trevor knows d, only Trevor can decrypt.
In practice, this is how RSA authentication works: suppose Lauren wants to send a signed
document, m, to Trevor. Lauren creates a digital signature s by exponentiating: s = m' mod n,
where d and n belong to Lauren's key pair. She sends s and m to Trevor. To verify the
signature, Trevor exponentiates and checks that the message m is recovered: m = m od n,
where e and n belong to Lauren's public key. RSA LABORATORIES, supra note 82, at 21.
108. Id. at 19.
109. A prime number is a number which is divisible only by itself and one. For example,
5, 7, and 13 are prime numbers whereas 14 and 27, which are divisible by 7 and 9,
respectively, are not.
110. RSA LABORATORIES, supra note 82, at 23-44.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. See infra Part IH.C.4 (providing more information on digital signatures).
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times faster than RSA.114 In hardware, DES is between 1,000 and
10,000 times as fast, depending on the implementation." s
Thus, although public key encryption by itself is ideal for short
e-mail messages, it was never designed for the voluminous, real-time
audio and video information which is starting to be transmitted
across the Internet.
However, the speed problem can be mitigated by using a
combination system of public key encryption and secret key
encryption. In practice, RSA is combined with a secret key
cryptosystem, such as DES, to encrypt a message by means of an
RSA digital envelope.116 Using the above example, suppose Lauren
wishes to send an encrypted message to Trevor. She first encrypts
the message with DES, using a randomly chosen DES key. Then she
looks up Trevor's public key and uses it to encrypt the DES key. The
DES-encrypted message and the RSA-encrypted DES key together
form the RSA digital envelope and are sent to Trevor. Upon
receiving the digital envelope, Trevor decrypts the DES key with his
private key, then uses the DES key to decrypt the message itself.
This combines the high speed of DES with the key-management
convenience of RSA.
4. Digital Signatures
The final piece in the Internet security puzzle is the digital
signature. Public key encryption algorithms (e.g., RSA) also allow
users to append a digital signature to an unencrypted message." 7 A
digital signature uniquely identifies the sender and connects the
sender to the message. In the previous example, if Lauren wants to
sign a message, she does a computation involving both her private
key and the message itself. The result is called the digital signature
and is attached to the message, which is then sent. To verify the
digital signature, Trevor does some computation involving the
message, the alleged signature, and Lauren's public key. If the
results are in a simple mathematical relation, the signature is verified
as genuine. If not, the signature is suspect, or the message may have
been modified." 8
114. RSA LABORATORIES, supra note 82, at 22.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 29.
117. Id. at 30.
118. Id.
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5. The Practical and Legal Significance of Key Lengths
Technology that is readily available today makes brute force
attacks 19 against cryptographic systems considered adequate for the
past several years both fast and cheap. 120 Attackers can use general
purpose microcomputers. However, attackers prepared to make a
higher investment can use custom-made, special-purpose chips.
These chips make the calculations used in brute force attacks much
faster and significantly lower the amortized cost per solution.12'
Currently, U.S. government agencies consider "strong"
encryption to describe systems which utilize asymmetric algorithms
(e.g., RSA) at keysizes over 512 bits, and symmetric algorithms (e.g.,
DES) at keysizes over 40 bits.'2 However, because of modem
technology, symmetric encryption using 40-bit keys offers virtually
no protection against brute-force attacks.ln Even DES, which uses
56-bit keys, is increasingly inadequate. In addition, cryptosystems
often succumb to "smarter" attacks than brute-force key search. 24
To most cryptographers, these keysizes are not considered "strong" at
all; mathematicians have considered these keysizes to be
"commercially inadequate" for several years. 125 To provide adequate
protection 126 against the most serious threats, such as well-funded
119. A brute force attack usually consists of having a very powerful computer (or more
likely several less powerful computers acting together) try all possible keys in order to find the
right one. Note that unless the encryption algorithm has a "back door"-a secret way of
quickly determining the correct key by other means---this is the main method of attack on
encryption. However, there has been rapid progress in this field of study, and new techniques,
such as differential cryptanalysis, are appearing that can supposedly break DES quickly. Id. at
64.
120. MATr BLAZE ET AL., MINIMAL KEY LENGTHS FOR SYMMETRIC CIPHERS TO PROVIDE
ADEQUATE COMMERCIAL SECURITY (January 1996).
121. Id.
122. RSA DATA SECURITY, INC., supra note 89, at 4.
123. Id. Also note that both 40-bit and 48-bit keys have recently been broken in a contest
sponsored by RSA Data Security, Inc. Jack Schofield, Breaking the Code, GUARDIAN, Feb. 6,
1997. BusINEssWIRE, Swiss-based Ph.D. Student Solves 48-bit Key in RSA Data Security's
Secret-Key Challenge, Feb. 14, 1997, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File.
124. Such as algebraic attacks and differential and linear cryptanalysis. For more
information, see RSA LABORATORIES, supra note 82, at 65-67.
125. Id. at 58. It should be noted that a small team of researchers recently broke RSA-130
(a 130-digit number roughly equivalent to a 432-bit RSA key) in less than eight months.
Vastly improved techniques for factoring allowed a significant improvement over the effort
used to break RSA-129 (which, before it was broken, was thought to be unbreakable). The
next step for scientists will be to break RSA-155, which is above a 512-bit key (which is above
the exportable limit for RSA encryption). Id. at 58.
126. Given an unlimited budget to purchase as many powerful computers as it takes and
enough time, it is theoretically possible to crack almost any encryption scheme, even though it
could cost billions and take thousands of years. The only type of algorithm guaranteed to be
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corporations or government intelligence agencies, experts
recommend that domestic customers utilize at least 80-bit symmetric
algorithm keys and 768-bit asymmetric algorithm keys.127
Unfortunately, encryption used in common software often does
not measure up to this standard. For example, Netscape Navigator
uses only a 40-bit key size in its symmetric encryption algorithms (in
its exportable implementation). However, the non-exportable, U.S.-
only version uses strong 128-bit keys.' 28
D. Technical Reasons Why Security is Still a Problem
In theory, all of the above fundamental encryption technology
could solve the vast majority of the Internet's security problems. The
art of encryption has advanced sufficiently so that current technology
could be implemented to address almost all security issues arising in
cyberspace. However, as is the case with most new technology, the
problems lie in the implementation of the technology.
Today, encryption is seen as something most "normal" people
would never use - it is often thought that only governments and
spies need to keep secret their conversations. However, most people
have a tendency to believe that once they get on-line, they somehow
become anonymous, and that their conversations are confidential.
This is exactly the opposite of what really happens. Everything a
user does on a computer can be, and usually is, monitored and logged
somewhere, on some other computer. This false sense of security
creates the impression that encryption is only for the paranoid or
those that are doing something "wrong" in cyberspace.
Compounding the problem is that encryption technology is not
designed into most Internet software. Stand-alone encryption
programs like the popular PGP program are confusing and difficult
for the novice user. In order to increase security on the Internet,
encryption must become more widely used. For that to happen, it
must be easy to use, and almost invisible to the user. The user of an
e-mail program should not even have to be aware that he is
encrypting the e-mail that he is sending - it should be automatic.
secure against all forms of mathematical and brute-force attacks is known as the "one-time
pad." A one-time pad is nothing more than a nonrepeating set of truly random key letters. The
sender uses each key letter on the pad to encrypt exactly one plaintext character. The receiver
has an identical pad and uses each key on the pad, in turn, to decrypt each letter of the
ciphertext. Id. at 96.
127. RSA DATA SECURITY, INC., supra note 89, at 4.
128. The difference in key sizes is due to the current export regulations on encryption
technology. See infra Part IV.A. See also infra note 152.
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Unfortunately, we are not at that level of integration yet. New
technology that takes the fundamental encryption technology and
makes it easier to use is the next step in Internet security. 12 9
IV. LEGAL REASONS WHY SECURITY IS STILL A PROBLEM
The Internet is a national and international network of networks.
Internet security protocols are thus constrained by laws regarding the
domestic and cross-border use of encryption technologies. Given the
potentially disastrous results if strong encryption technology were to
fall into the "wrong hands,"'30 the government must carefully balance
its duties of national defense and law enforcement with the
constitutional right of privacy of its citizens. As it stands now, the
government has chosen to tip the scale towards restricting encryption
technology. Currently, controls on the export of encryption
technologies present an obstacle to the implementation of effective
Internet security standards. Furthermore, domestic controls loom,
and if imposed, would create an additional obstacle to making a
secure Internet a reality.
A. Export Controls on Encryption Technology
The U.S. government places heavy restrictions on the export of
encryption technology. Through the following regulations, the
government effectively outlaws the export of all but the weakest
encryption technology.' 3'
1. Arms Export Control Act & International Traffic in
Arms Regulations
The Arms Export Control Act (AECA)32 is the statutory
authority that governs export controls of defense articles and services
to foreign countries. Promulgated pursuant to the AECA are the
International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR).133 The State
129. See infra Part VI for more information on liPng, which promises to make encryption
technology part of the underlying foundation of the Internet.
130. One could imagine a possible scenario where terrorists secretly plan an attack,
communicating with each other via strong encryption.
131. It should be noted that there has been very recent activity in this area of law. As of
January 1, 1997, significant new rules regarding the export of encryption technology took
effect. While these represent an evolution in U.S. encryption law, the policies reflected in the
old regulations are needed to understand the case law and will likely influence interpretation of
the current regulations.
132. Arms Export Control Act, 22 U.S.C. § 2778 (1988).
133. International Traffic in Arms Regulations, 22 C.F.R. §§ 120-130 (1995).
THE FUTURE OFINTERNET SECURITY
Department is given regulatory authority to carry out the ITAR by
the President. The ITAR apply to items placed on the U.S. Munitions
List (USML) 134 that the government considers inherently military,
e.g., nuclear bombs, jet fighters, and until very recently,
cryptography. The State Department continues to reform the export
control procedures applicable to those products incorporating
cryptography which were controlled by the ITAR in Category
XIII(b)(1). 135 The penalty for violating the AECA is severe - fines
up to $1 million for each violation, or imprisonment of up to 10
years, or both.136
Up until very recently, a vendor seeking to export a product
using cryptography first submitted a request to the State
Department's Defense Trade Control Office. 137 Export jurisdiction
could then be passed to the Department of Commerce or could
remain with the State Department for further review. The regulations
required a lengthy process before export was either approved or
denied, which could involve the National Security Agency.138 Also,
the details of the export approval process changed frequently. 13 9
Note that it was the express policy of the NSA not to restrict export
of cryptography for authentication; it was only concerned with the
use of cryptography for privacy.140
Under the former ITAR regime, applications to export
cryptographic software as strong as (or stronger than) DES were
routinely denied.141 The export of non-key escrow encryption
software was limited to 40-bit keys (symmetric algorithms) and 512-
bit keys (asymmetric algorithms), a level of security that was
134. 22 C.F.R. § 121.1 (1995).
135. The ITAR received minor amendments on February 16, 1996, to establish an
exemption for the temporary export of cryptographic products for personal use. 22 C.F.R. §§
123, 126. The effect of the change was to ease the burden on United States citizens and lawful
permanent residents who have the need to temporarily export cryptographic products when
leaving the U.S. for brief periods of time.
136. 22 U.S.C. § 2778(c) (1988). See infra Part IV.D for a discussion of the new export
regulations.
137. Note that under the new Clinton Administration Plan, this has changed to the faster,
more predictable, and possibly more encryption-friendly Commerce Department. See infra
Part IV.D.
138. RSA DATA SEcUtrry, INC., supra note 89, at 10.
139. The ITAR were considered by some in the computer industry to be an abuse of
authority by the Executive branch because the process for deciding which applications were
approved and which were denied was confusing and constantly changed.
140. RSA DATA SECURITY, INC., supra note 89, at 7.
141. Carol Levin, DigitalPrivacy... Take Two, PC MAG., Nov. 7, 1995.
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established in 1992, but is considered weak by today's standards. 142
Presumably, this is because the NSA felt that it could easily crack
any message with a key of less than 40 bits and thus was not
concerned with these weak keys.
2. Problems with the ITAR
The ITAR are under attack from many directions. U.S.
businesses object to being barred from competing in foreign markets
for encryption technology. 43 The constitutionality of the ITAR has
been called into question as applied to the publication of encryption
information;'" and there are Congressional attempts to limit its
strictures. 145
While the ITAR were, in theory, rationally related to legitimate
national security objectives, in practice, their viability was doubtful.
Because strong encryption is currently available worldwide, 46 and no
effective way exists to prevent the illicit export of encryption
technology, the ITAR's only real effect was to prevent U.S. firms
from competing with those from other nations. 47
It has become extremely easy to acquire strong encryption
technology. It is impossible to prevent a foreigner from coming to
the U.S., going to the nearest computer store and purchasing a "not-
for-export" piece of software that contains strong encryption, and
leaving the country with it. No customs inspection procedure checks
for software on a person's notebook computer. It is also very easy to
142. For more information on optimal key lengths, see supra Part III.C.5.
143. See infra note 146 and accompanying text.
144. See infra note 158 and accompanying text.
145. See supra Part IV.B (discussing recent legislation).
146. See 142 CONG. REC. S1517 (1996) ("According to a survey of cryptographic
products conducted by Trusted Information Systems, as of December 1995, 497 foreign
products from 28 countries were available with encryption security. Almost 200 of these
foreign products used strong encryption that American companies are barred from selling
abroad.').
147 For a good example of how foreign companies not restrained by the ITAR are
competing against U.S. companies, see John Markoff, Japanese Chips May Scramble U.S.
Export Ban, N.Y. TuviEs, June 3, 1996, at DI (The large Japanese corporation N.T.T. has
begun selling a powerful encryption chip set (which uses Triple-DES and 1024-bit RSA) that it
co-developed with a Japanese subsidiary of RSA. In a final twist of irony, N.T.T. may start
exporting these chips to the U.S., as there are no U.S. laws regarding the import of encryption
technology. The N.T.T. chip set also underscores fundamental differences that exist between
Japan and the United States on the issue of privacy over the Internet. While in the United
States, the government struggles to maintain its ability to conduct electronic surveillance,
Article 21 of Japan's Constitution specifically forbids wiretapping. Id.)
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acquire the technology over the Internet. "Hackers' 48 have reduced
the code needed to implement RSA down to an incredibly small
size - only three lines of text. 49  Some have then started attaching
the text to all e-mail messages that they send to people around the
world as a form of protest against the ITAR.
The size of the losses to U.S. businesses resulting from the
ITAR makes encryption one of the critical issues facing the
American software industry today.5 0  A recent report by the
Computer Systems Policy Project estimated that U.S. companies
stand to lose between $30 and $60 billion in revenues and over
200,000 high-tech jobs by the year 2000 because U.S. companies are
handicapped in the global market.'5' The Commerce Department
concurs. 52 American businesses also suffer staggering losses due to
economic espionage. 53 Many of these losses could be prevented if
strong encryption were used more widely. 54
148. DENNIS LONGLEY & MICHAEL SHAIN, DICIONARY OF INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY
146 (2d ed. 1986) (A "hacker... [is] a computer enthusiast. The term is normally applied to
people who take delight in experimenting with system hardware, software and communication
systems. Sometimes used with the connotation of illegality, especially in reference to
unauthorized access to data.').
149. The following is an actual PERL program (with minor scrambling to render it




150. 142 CONG. REC. S1517 (1996).
151. Id.
152. The Commerce Department recently reported that U.S. export controls may have a
"negative effect on U.S. competitiveness" and "may discourage" the use of strong encryption
domestically since manufacturers want to make only one product for both domestic and export
use. Id. Because of the ITAR, companies were forced to develop two different versions of
their software. For example, a U.S.-only version of Netscape Navigator uses 128-bit keys,
while the exportable version uses 40-bit keys. To control the distribution of the 128-bit
version of Navigator, it carries the following strongly worded license:
The software and any underlying technology may not b exported outside the
United States or to any foreign entity or "foreign person" as defined by U.S.
government regulations, including without limitation, anyone who is not a
citizen, national, or lawful permanent resident of the United States. By
downloading or using the software, you are agreeing to the foregoing and you
are warranting that you are not a "foreign person" or under the control of a
foreign person.
Netscape Comm., Inc., Netscape US - Only Software Eligibility Affidavit (visited Nov. 10,
1996) <http://www.netscape.comleng/US-Currentrmdex.html>.
153. See 142 CONG. REc. S1517 (1996) (testimony of FBI director Freeh that White
House Office of Science and Technology Policy puts the amount of that loss at $100 billion
per year).
154. One U.S. based manufacturer has been quoted as saying, "We had a multi-year,
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Thus, the continued viability of the ITAR as a policy tool was
considered dubious. 5 5 It did not prevent foreign powers from
obtaining strong cryptographic technology, and its unintended
consequences were costing Americans jobs and money.
3. Litigation Involving the ITAR
Despite the government's strong stance on regulating encryption
technology, there have been recent cases that have tested the
boundaries of the ITAR. The first case involved the author of PGP,
Philip R. Zimmermann.1 56 For more than two years, Zimmermann
was the subject of a federal grand jury investigation. The
government was considering charging Zimmermann with conspiring
with unknown persons outside the United States to illegally export
PGP from the United States in violation of U.S. munitions law after
PGP found its way overseas via the Internet15 7 On January 13, 1996,
for no given reason, federal prosecutors dropped their investigation
of Zimmermann. However, the government's lengthy investigation
sent a strong message to those who were considering challenging the
government's stance on export regulations.
In Bernstein,158 the ITAR were challenged on First Amendment
grounds. The case involved a graduate student who sought to publish
an encryption algorithm he had developed along with an explanation
and a computer implementation, but was partially restrained by the
multi-billion dollar contract stolen off our P.C. [while bidding in a foreign country]. Had it
been encrypted, [the foreign competitor] could not have used it in the bidding time frame." Id.
155. On May 30, 1996, a report from the National Research Council (NRC) concluded
that if cryptography were used throughout society, it would prevent industry and personal
secrets from being stolen and preserve the nation's banking and telecommunications
infrastructure from attack by hackers and terrorists. Will Rodger, Report: U.S. Should
Promote Cryptography, INTER@crlvE WK., May 30, 1996. The NRC's Computer Science
and Telecommunications Board's congressionally-mandated study, named "Cryptography's
Role in Securing the Information Society," calls for no restrictions on domestic use of
cryptography but falls short of recommending that export controls should be eliminated. It
does state that the government should raise the legally exportable limit to 56-bit keys from the
current 40-bit key limit. A major industry group, the Information Technology Association of
America called the NRC report "authoritative and highly credible," and appealed to the
Clinton Administration to reconsider its current encryption policies. Will Rodger, NRC
Encryption Report Gains Support, INTER@CTIvE WV., May 31, 1996.
156. Dinah Zeiger, Brown to Urge Easing Controls on Encryption Software, DENV. POST,
January 13, 1996, at E-1.
157. Note that "strong" encryption software is usually posted on the Internet with
warnings that foreign persons must not download the software. See, e.g., supra note 152. At
this time, it is unclear if such warnings are legally effective. In addition, the State Department
has not issued any guidelines on how to restrict foreigners from downloading encryption
software from the Internet.
158. Bernstein v. U.S. Dep't of State, 945 F. Supp. 1279 (N.D. Cal. 1996).
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State Department. 59 He alleged that "the licensing scheme under the
ITAR imposes an unconstitutional prior restraint on cryptographic
speech, whether that speech is defined as a defense article or
technical data."' 60  Although the government's constitutionally
mandated duty to provide for the national defense is the main reason
for the export restrictions, Judge Marilyn Hall Patel had previously
denied a government motion to dismiss.' 61 This was the first time
that a U.S. court found that source code is speech under First
Amendment analysis. 62
Judge Patel held that while the bulk of the ITAR could be seen
as proper to control the spread of defense-related commodities
abroad, and not as restraint on expression, this was not the case
regarding encryption. She stated that a section of the ITAR that deals
with encryption "is directed very specifically at applied scientific
research and speech on the topic of encryption. That it regulates
encryption in the interest of national security does not alone justify a
prior restraint."' 63
While the court did not rule on whether the regulatory purpose
behind Category XII(B) 164 was content neutral, Judge Patel stated that
even an otherwise valid licensing scheme must still contain adequate
procedural safeguards in order to be constitutional.1 65 She then went
on to hold that the ITAR licensing scheme of cryptographic software
fails to provide adequate procedural safeguards--'because [the ITAR
licensing scheme] fails to provide for a time limit on the licensing
decision, for prompt judicial review and for a duty on the part of the
ODTC [the State Department's Office of Defense Trade Controls] to
go to court and defend a denial of a license, the ITAR licensing
159. In addition to the Bernstein case, another academician has also recently filed suit to
protest the ITAR. See Michele Fuetsch, Professor Fights U.S. on Encryption, PLAIN DEALER
(CLEv.), August 8, 1996, at IB.
160. Id. at 1285.
161. See Bernstein v. U.S. Dep't of State, 922 F. Supp. 1426 (N.D. Cal. 1996) (In doing
so, she ruled that the source code in Bernstein's cryptographic algorithm is speech and thus is
protected from prior restraint by the First Amendment. Id. at 1436.)
162. But see Kam v. U.S. Dep't of State, 925 F. Supp. 1, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5707
(D.D.C. 1996), where Kam attempted to export a book containing cryptographic source code
and a diskette containing the book's source code but was stopped from exporting the diskette
by the State Department. Charles Richey, J. dismissed Kam's action under the political
question doctrine stating that the issue was a policy question within the purview of the
Executive Branch.
163. Bernstein v. U.S. Dep't of State, 945 F. Supp. 1279, 1288 (N.D. Cal. 1996).
164. Category XII(B) of the ITAR Munitions List includes cryptographic systems. See
infra Part IV.A.1.
165. Bernstein v. U.S. Dep't of State, 945 F. Supp. 1279, 1290 (N.D. Cal. 1996).
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scheme as applied to Category XII(B) acts as an unconstitutional
prior restraint in violation of the First Amendment."' 166
Finally, the judge also held that sections of the ITAR 167 are
vague, because they do not "give people.., a reasonable opportunity
to know what is prohibited.' 68 She further stated that "given the
direct application of these exemptions to First Amendment
protections, the uncertainty created in scientists about what speech is
subject to regulation under the ITAR is unacceptable." 69
In the final result, it is unlikely that the courts will completely
eliminate export controls on encryption technology. They have
shown too much belief in a strict separation of powers to second
guess the Executive Branch when it comes to national security. 70
However, successful lawsuits may result in a loosening of
government regulations, and combined with pending legislation,' 7'
may have the effect desired by the plaintiffs.
B. Domestic Controls on Encryption Technology
While there are currently no restrictions on the domestic use of
encryption, the following Acts define the government's authority
over encryption technology. The main effect of these acts is to
establish the NSA as the main government agency responsible for
dealing with national encryption issues on a technical level. In
addition to the Acts, the Clinton Administration, with its "Clipper
Chip" proposal, was attempting to initiate the first step in possibly
creating domestic controls on encryption. 72
The Computer Security Act of 1987173 requires federal agencies
to identify and develop security plans for computer systems that
contain sensitive information. The Act intends to prevent persons
from illegally breaking into government computer systems and
166. Id.
167. 22 C.F.R. §§ 120.11(a)(8) (which contains the exemption for information available
to the public "through fundamental research in science and engineering") and 120.10(a)(5)
(which exempts "general scientific, mathematical or engineering principles" commonly taught
in schools and universities).
168. Bernstein v. U.S. Dep't of State, 945 F. Supp. 1279, 1293-4 (N.D. Cal. 1996).
169. Id. at 1294.
170. See Kam v. U.S. Dep't. of State, 925 F. Supp. 1, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5707
(D.D.C. 1996).
171. See infra Part lV.C.
172. See infra Part IV.C for more information on the Clipper Chip.
173. Computer Security Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-235, 101 Stat. 1724 (codified at 40
U.S.C. § 759 and in sections of Title 15 of the United States Code.).
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altering or destroying records. 74 The Act gives the National Institute
of Standards & Technology (NIST) responsibility for setting forth
guidelines to protect the security of sensitive, 7 but unclassified,
computer information.176
The Brooks Act' 7 was created to ensure the economic and
efficient procurement of automated data processing and
telecommunications equipment by federal agencies. NIST provides
cryptographic technology for unclassified government information
primarily pursuant to the Brooks Act. 178 The Brooks Act explicitly
grants control over national security information data processing
needs to the President, who then delegates that task to the NSA or
other military agencies. 179 The NSA has defacto control over export
of cryptographic products. In the past, the State Department did not
grant a license without NSA approval, and routinely granted licenses
whenever the NSA did approve. 80
C. Clipper Chip
Although there are currently no domestic controls on
encryption, the current Clinton Administration has proposed what
appears to be an attempt at control with the Clipper Chip plan. In
order to meet its three stated security objectives (telecommunications
security, national security, and public safety), the Administration
wants a product that would provide high quality encryption and
would be capable of allowing government officials to intercept
encrypted communications. In order to force what has become
known as the "Clipper Chip" into becoming an industry standard, the
Administration had planned on requiring use of the Clipper Chip in
all secure communications equipment sold to the government.' 8 '
174. See Maria H. Benecki, Developments Under the Freedom of Information Act, 1988
DUKE L.J. 566, 567 (1987).
175. "Sensitive information" means nonsecret information that may adversely affect the
national interest, the conduct of federal programs, or the rights created under the Privacy Act
(H.R. 145, 100th Cong. § 3(c)(4), 133 CONG. REC. H5340 (1987)).
176. Benecki, supra note 174.
177. Renae A. Franks, The National Security Agency and Its Interference with Private
Sector Computer Security, 72 IOWA L. REv. 1015, 1019 (1987).
178. Id.
179. Id. at 1020; see also United States v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319 (1936)
(the President's power over national security is based on his constitutional authority in foreign
relations).
180. RSA DATA SECURITY, INC., supra note 89, at 5.
181. NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF STANDARDS AND TECHNOLOGY, U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE,
FEDERAL INFORMATION PROCESSING STANDARDS PUBLICATIONS 185, ESCROWED ENCRYPTION
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The key escrow technology used in the Clipper Chip is based on
a tamper-resistant hardware chip that implements a NSA-designed
classified encryption algorithm called Skipjack. 182 The key escrow
technology implemented by the Clipper Chip uses a method that
allows all communications encrypted with the chip, regardless of
what session key is used or how it is selected, to be decrypted
through a special key unique to that particular Clipper Chip and a
special Law Enforcement Access Field (LEAF) transmitted with the
encrypted communications.
The chip's unique key is formed as the "exclusive or" (XOR) of
two components, each of which is encrypted and stored in escrow
with a separate escrow agent. The key components of both escrow
agents are needed to construct the chip's unique key and decrypt
intercepted communications. These components are released to an
authorized government official only in conjunction with authorized
electronic surveillance and only in accordance with procedures issued
and approved by the Attorney General. The key components are
transmitted to a government tamper-resistant decrypt device, where
they are decrypted and combined to form the chip's unique key.
Upon termination of the electronic surveillance, the keys are
destroyed.
Supporters state that the Clipper Chip provides strong
communications security (80-bit keys) while simultaneously
allowing lawful government access. They assert that if the
government were to adopt and promote a standard that provides
strong encryption without government access, society could suffer
severe economic and human losses resulting from a diminished
capability of law enforcement to investigate and prosecute organized
crime and terrorism and from a reduced capability for foreign
intelligence. The government's overriding concern is that strong
encryption could be used by terrorists, drug dealers, or child
pornographers to prevent law enforcement from discovering their
plans or listening in on their conversations. They maintain that they
do not want to deny Americans the right to strong cryptography, but
they do want to be able to read it when law enforcement demands it
for the good of society in general. 8 3
STANDARD (EES) (1994).
182. Because Skipjack is a block cipher that uses an 80-bit key, it may be more secure
than DES. Ernest F. Brickell et al., SKIPJACK Review: Interim Report, July 29, 1993.
183. The Clinton Administration has appointed a special envoy for encryption policy,
David Aaron, who recently stated that encryption markets worldwide would soon include, and
possibly be dominated by, key escrow technology. Will Rodger, Consensus on Intellectual
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However, the Clipper Chip proposal was met with negative
reactions from the cryptographic community.'l 4
In addition, there has been general concern that the Clipper Chip
is just the first step in the U.S. government eventually requiring
mandatory key escrow encryption for all forms of electronic
communication. 85  Any such federal legislation would raise
important constitutional issues. First, Fourth, and Fifth Amendment
doctrines as well as evolving conceptions of the constitutional right
to privacy would be involved in analyzing such legislation. While
the analysis of the constitutional law is outside the scope of this
comment, others have started to study this question and have reached
some early conclusions. 186 As the law stands today, private non-
commercial users of encryption probably have a Fourth Amendment
right to resist mandatory key escrow.187 Whether commercial users
would have such a right under current doctrines is less clear. t88 Even
Encryption Policies Challenged, INTER@CTrE WK., Jan. 29, 1997. For further recent
comments on this subject by the Clinton Administration, see Ambassador David Aaron,
Special Envoy for Cryptography, Speech at the RSA Data Security Conference (Jan. 28, 1997).
184. Levin, supra note 141, at 29. Many firms objected to the potential loss of privacy
that could result from the deployment of key escrow cryptography and the associated sharing
of previously private cryptographic keys with government escrow agents. Id. Others raised
objections to the government's use of the public treasury to attempt to impose a de facto
standard that permitted governmental agencies access to any desired communications. Id.
Also, some objected to the introduction of the classified Skipjack algorithm as the standard for
the protection of unclassified information.
In addition, it is highly doubtful that foreigners with which U.S. citizens wish to
communicate securely will feel safe with the U.S. government holding their keys in escrow.
RSA LABORATORIES, supra note 82, at 64. Moreover, the current rate of increase in
computing power is such that Skipjack's 80-bit key can be expected to be easily broken in less
than eighteen years. Id. Finally, many people, especially software companies, objected to the
requirement of a hardware implementation because of its cost and the limitation
accommodating a government-designed chip imposes on the overall product design. Levin,
supra note 141.
185. While the original Clipper Chip proposal appears to have faded away, the Clinton
Administration is currently preparing new legislation that would strongly encourage the
private use of key recovery encryption (although the phrase "key recovery" is used in place of
the original Clipper Chip's "key escrow" term, the idea of government access to encryption
keys is the same). The legislation would create a massive new key management infrastructure
(mandating key recovery for participation) to facilitate electronic commerce, while giving law
enforcement easy access to decryption keys held by key recovery agents. Administration
Encryption Draft Bill Would Set Key Recovery Standards, COMM. DAILY, Mar. 27, 1997.
186. A. MICHAEL FROOMKIN, The Constitutionality of Mandatory Key Escrow - A First
Look, in BUILDING IN BIG BROTHER: THE CRYPTOGRAPHIC POLICY DEBATE 413 (1995). In
addition, the Sixth Conference on Computers, Freedom, and Privacy held a moot court
proceeding on whether the U.S. government can criminalize unauthorized encryption. PR
NEWSWIRE, MIT to Host Internet and Civil Liberties Conference, Mar. 13, 1996.
187. See FROOMKiN, supra note 186.
188. Id.
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the rights of private non-commercial users may be a close question
given the current state of civil rights doctrine, and the great
importance that the courts give to law enforcement and national
security.189
D. Recent Changes to U.S. Government Controls on Encryption
Technology
Encryption is becoming a hot-button issue in Congress, due in
large part to the explosion of interest in the Internet.190
Representatives from computer-related companies, such as National
Semiconductor, Sun Microsystems, Hewlett-Packard, RSA, EDS,
Lotus, and others have been negotiating with the Clinton
Administration and members of Congress, demanding a loosening of
the ITAR.'9g Industry lobbying, the economics involved in restricting
encryption, and the desire of the current Congress to reduce
government regulation and intervention in the private sector, has
made the ITAR the subject of very recent activity by Congress.
The policy level changes focus on two areas: the removal of
barriers to U.S. firms competing in international markets for
encryption business' 92 and the placing of limitations on the federal
government's role in choosing encryption methods for Americans. 93
As a result of the negative reaction to the Clipper Chip and the
increasing pressure from U.S. computer companies, the Clinton
189. Id.
190. Will Rodger, Encryption Becomes Key Debate, INTER@CTIVE WK., March 25, 1996,
at 5.
191. Karen Rodriguez, Vendors Say U.S. Encryption Export Restrictions Threaten
Internet Security, INFoWORLD, March 6, 1995, at 27.
192. See Security and Freedom Through Encryption (SAFE) Act, H.R. 695, 105th Cong.,
143 CONG. REc. E245 (1997); Encrypted Communications Privacy Act of 1997, S. 376, 105th
Cong., 143 CONG. REc. S1749 (1997); Promotion of Commerce On-Line in the Digital Era
(Pro-CODE) Act of 1997, S. 377, 105th Cong., 143 CONG. REc. S1755 (1997). Note that even
though the three bills differ slightly, all of them would allow the unrestricted export of
"generally available" or "public domain" encryption software. Since strong encryption is
already "generally available" from foreign companies (see supra note 146 and accompanying
text), this would effectively relax export restrictions.
193. See Security and Freedom Through Encryption (SAFE) Act, H.R. 695, 105th Cong.,
143 CONG. REc. E245 (1997); Encrypted Communications Privacy Act of 1997, S. 376, 105th
Cong., 143 CONG. REc. S1749 (1997); Promotion of Commerce On-Line in the Digital Era
(Pro-CODE) Act of 1997, S. 377, 105th Cong., 143 CONG. REc. S1755 (1997). While not
using identical language, all of the bills would prohibit the federal govemment from imposing
mandatory encryption policies on the domestic market. It should also be noted that while
earlier versions of these bills stalled in Congress in 1996, their sponsors re-introduced them in
1997 with minor changes. See Aaron Pressman, Several Bills to Relax U.S. Encryption Export
Coming, RErrERS FIN. SERVIcE, Feb. 12, 1997.
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Administration has over time introduced several revisions to the
original Clipper Chip proposal. In the most recent version,
introduced on October 1, 1996, the Administration set forth its plan
for a national encryption policy. 94 This proposal was enacted into
law' 95 via Executive Order on November 15, 1996.196 One positive
element of the new interim rules is that it demonstrates the Clinton
Administration's recognition of the important need to come up with a
workable encryption policy. Highlights of the new regulations are:
(1) the increase in the exportable limit from 40-bit to 56-bit
encryption for the next two years, provided that exporters commit to
build and market future products that support key recovery; 97 (2) the
requirement of key recovery capabilities in all exportable encryption
products after two years; (3) the "encouragement" of key recovery
systems through international agreements, standards processes, and a
new key management infrastructure; and (4) the transfer of
jurisdiction over encryption export licensing to the Department of
Commerce (Bureau of Export Administration), 198 with a grant of a
formal vote in the process to the Department of Justice.
Unfortunately, these new regulations do not offer much of a
compromise on the export of encryption technologies. While the
Administration deserves credit for recognizing that a trusted public
key infrastructure is an important component of a workable national
encryption policy, the new, policy attempts to use the need for a
public key infrastructure as a means to impose key escrow
domestically. 99 Its minor (an additional 16 bits) 200 and limited (two
year maximum) increase in exportable encryption technology does
not go far enough to create a secure infrastructure for the Internet.20'
The regulations ignore the modest recommendations of the recent
194. Elizabeth Corcoran, US. to Ease Encryption Restrictions, wASH GTON POST, Oct.
1,1996, at Al.
195. 61 Fed. Reg. 68,572 (1996) (interim rule) (the interim rule amends the Export
Administration Regulations (EAR) by exercising jurisdiction over, and imposing new
combined national security and foreign policy controls on, certain encryption items that were
on the United States Munitions List (in the ITAR). See supra note 135).
196. Exec. Order No. 13,026, 61 Fed. Reg. 58,767 (1996).
197. See supra note 185 for more information on Administration key recovery proposals.
198. The Bureau of Export Administration has a very informative web page regarding
commercial encryption export controls, see <http://www.bxa.doc.gov/encstart.htm>.
199. By virtue of the fact that most companies will only sell products domestically that
meet the export requirements in order to reduce costs. See supra note 152.
200. Note that the insecurity of 48-bit keys has already been demonstrated, and that 56-bit
keys will be the next level scientists attempt to crack. See supra note 123.
201. Note that 56-bit encryption is still considered relatively "weak" encryption. See
supra Part III.C.5.
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NRC report on encryption,20 2 and pushes users towards a key
recovery system, whether they want it or not. It also continues to
raise questions with respect to private and international key
exchange,203 and contains no privacy protections or restrictions on
law enforcement access to escrowed keys. The transfer of
jurisdiction to the Commerce Department can be seen as a good
move, but it is too soon to tell if the fundamental export policy will
change. While the new policy has garnered some support in the
industry, others have come out strongly against it.204
The international community is divided on the subject of
government regulation of encryption technology. At a recent
meeting of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD), the group declined to endorse policy favoring
key recovery systems, and remained neutral on whether governments
should set up key recovery systems. 205
The new regulations also call into question the result of the
Bernstein case.206 It is uncertain how the holding of that case will
affect the new export regulations. It may be that the ITAR's prior
restraint problems are not applicable to the new regulations-unlike
the State Department, the Commerce Department is much more
likely to act upon export applications within a specific time frame. 207
Regardless of the specifics of this new policy, it remains the
case that any imposition of domestic cryptographic protocols would
necessarily significantly impact the Internet. Aside from switchover
costs to a "key recovery" system as outlined in the new
Administration policy, the preeminence the United States plays in the
202. See supra note 155.
203. For example, officials have been unable to explain what legal standards will apply to
communications when keys are held in foreign countries that do not have the protections of the
Fourth Amendment.
204. Kristi Essick and Jeff Walsh, Encryption Policy Fails to Please U.S. Vendors,
INFOWORLD, Oct. 7, 1996, at 14. George Leopold, Industry Group Calls New Commerce
Policy 'Intrusive,' ELECrRONIC ENGNmEERING TIMES, Jan. 6, 1997, at 18.
205. The OECD is an advisory body comprising of 29 nations that assists in coordinating
non-binding economic policies among member nations. In its recently endorsed proposals for
setting cryptography policy worldwide, it settled on recommendations that said national policy
"may allow" use of key recovery encryption. Supporters of liberalizing encryption regulations
hailed the proposals as proof the world is rejecting the Administration's pro-key recovery
policies. Will Rodger, Consensus On Intellectual Encryption Policies Challenged,
INTER@CrIVE WK., Jan. 29, 1997; OECD Rejects Administration Views on Cryptography,
CoMM. DAILY, Mar. 28, 1997.
206. See supra Part IV.A.3.
207. Tom Abate, Export Restrictions Ruled Illegal on Secrecy Software, S.F. EXAMINER,
Dec. 19, 1996, at Al.
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Internet community 2°8 suggests that the great promise of the Internet
could be thwarted if a large portion of its users distance themselves
from the rest of the world by becoming locked into a particular
cryptographic architecture.
V. LEGAL ISSUES WHICH TURN ON SECURITY ISSUES
The legal effects of the Internet are just now starting to appear in
courts. The following is a brief analysis of several areas of the law
that have been effected by the Internet and will be further changed by
the future deployment of lPng.209 Crimes perpetrated on the Internet
can be grouped into three major categories: (1) computer crimes; (2)
fraud; and (3) non-computer crimes.210 Computer crimes, such as
breaking into a computer system, include those crimes where
knowledge of a computer system is essential to commit the crime.
As stated earlier, computer crime has been rapidly increasing. 21'
Since the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act212 was revised in 1986,
several cases have been prosecuted under it.213 Of the cases pursued,
most involved theft or fraud including loss of property. Internet
fraud usually involves stealing credit card numbers or transferring
funds to a numbered account in another country.2 4 Fraud is the only
non-computer crime acknowledged by the Computer Fraud and
Abuse Act of 1986.215 Non-computer crimes include all other forms
of crime and tort such as copyright infringement, invasion of privacy,
and defamation.
208. Roughly 60 percent of computers linked to the Internet are in the United States.
ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 831 (E.D. Pa. 1996).
209. See infra Part VII for how these areas of the law will be affected.
210. See Jo-Ann M. Adams, Comment, Controlling Cyberspace: Evolution of the
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act as the Internet Comes ofAge, 12 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER &
HIGH TECH. L. J. 403 (1996).
211. See supra Part III.B.
212. 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (1988); 18 U.S.C.S. § 1030 (Law. Co-op. 1994).
213. See United States v. Sykes, 4 F.3d 697, 698 (8th Cir. 1993) (unauthorized use of an
automated teller machine and personal identification number); United States v. Fernandez, 92
Cr. 563 (RO), 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3590, at *3 (D.C.S.D.N.Y. Mar. 24, 1993) (various
computer-related crimes, including accessing a Federal-interest computer without
authorization and altering or damaging information); United States v. Coleman, No. 90-55635,
1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 14833, at *2 (9th Cir. Cal. 1991) (attempt to defraud the government of
$9,469,348 in defrauding numerous banks of loans to finance fraudulent purchases of real
property); United States v. Carron, No. 90-50680, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 4838 (9th Cir. 1991)
(unauthorized computer access using two credit cards).
214. Joseph Radigan, Info Highway Robbers Try Cracking the Vault... Or 50 Million
Ways to Fleece Your Banker, U.S. BANKER, May 1995, at 67.
215. 18 U.S.C. § 1030.
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A. Copyright
A major question dealing with copyright infringement on the
Internet is whether a computer system faces liability if, unbeknownst
to its operators, the system is used to facilitate copyright
infringement.216 Copyright infringement occurs whenever someone
exercises the rights reserved exclusively for the copyright owner
without authorization.2t 7 Infringement need not be intentional, as
liability for innocent infringement is well-established. 218 Third party
liability may occur under the theory of vicarious liability (when "the
right and ability to supervise (the infringer) coalesce with an obvious
and direct financial interest in the exploitation of the copyrighted
materials")219 or the theory of contributory infringement (when "one
who, with knowledge of the infringing activity, induces, causes or
materially contributes to the infringing conduct of another").220
This notion of third party liability for copyright infringement
has large implications in the Internet community, especially for on-
line service providers, who may unwittingly be hosting unauthorized
copies of copyrighted material on their computer systems. This issue
causes considerable concern to the on-line service industry, with
recent decisions split on the' issue that may greatly increase their
exposure to civil liability.
One of the first plaintiffs to successfully recover damages from
a bulletin board sysop was Playboy Enterprises.221 Playboy was
concerned that the unchecked trading of its pictures over the Internet
was impacting its profits. In order to set an example, they filed suit
against a Florida BBS (Bulletin Board System)m in December of
1993.2z The BBS was owned by George Frena, who argued that the
high quality computerized copies of the photographs were unsolicited
216. Edward A. Cavazos, Litigation On-Line: Cyber Issues Loom, AM. LAW.,
SUPPLEMENT: LrrIG. ATA CROSSROADS, May, 1995, at 54.
217. 17 U.S.C. § 501 (1988 & Supp. 111990).
218. See Carter v. Hawaii Transp. Co., 201 F. Supp. 301 (D. Haw. 1961) (citing Towle v.
Ross, 32 F. Supp. 125, 127 (1940)).
2.19. See H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, 94th Cong. 158-60 (1976).
220. Id.
221. Cavazos, supra note 216, at 55.
222. A BBS consists of a computer and associated software which typically provides an
electronic message database where people can log in and leave messages. Note that while
most of the cases discussed below involve an on-line service bureau, such as CompuServe, or a
local BBS theories involved would also apply to the Internet (all the on-line service bureaus
like CompuServe, and most major BBSs are connected together via the Internet).
223. Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Frena, 839 F. Supp. 1552 (M.D. Fla. 1993).
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user contributions to publicly accessible file collections.224 However,
the court ruled that Frena was liable for contributory infringement
even though he was not directly responsible for placing the Playboy
images on the system.? The court stated:
It does not matter that Defendant Frena may have been unaware of
the copyright infringement. Intent to infringe is not needed to find
copyright infringement. Intent or knowledge is not an element of
infringement, and thus even an innocent infringer is liable for
infringement; rather, innocence is significant to a trial court when
it fixes statutory damages, which is a remedy equitable in
nature.226
Clearly, this decision could have a chilling effect on the on-line
community. Given current technology, it is almost impossible to
determine which of the thousands of images that a sysop may have
on his system infringe on someone's copyright. From a practical
perspective, this strict standard is impossible to enforce on sysops,
unless they are forced to do nothing but constantly scan their systems
for infringing works. This is an unworkable standard that would be
difficult, at best, to enforce.2 7
The Northern District of California Federal District court relied
on the Playboy"8 decision to uphold the civil seizure of a BBS whose
sysops made arguments similar to Frena's in their defense.229 The
Japanese-based maker of video game systems, Sega Enterprises Ltd.,
asserted that the "Maphia" BBS was distributing pirated versions of
the company's game software. The court held that, "[a]lthough
defendants did not know exactly when games would be uploaded
onto or downloaded from bulletin board by unknown users,
defendants' role in the copying, including provision of facilities,
direction, knowledge and encouragement, amounted to contributory
infringement as did defendants' advertising, sale and distribution of
video game copiers." 30
In the similar case of Frank Music Corp. v. CompuServe, Inc.,231
224. Id. at 1554.
225. Id. at 1559.
226. Id. at 1559 (citing D.C. Comics Inc. v. Mini Gift Shop, 912 F.2d 29 (2d Cir. 1990)).
227. The standard would become completely unenforceable if the postings were
encrypted so that there was no possible way for the sysop to know what was posted, let alone if
it was infringing material.
228. Playboy, 839 F. Supp. at 1552.
229. Sega Enters. Ltd. v. MAPHIA, 857 F. Supp. 679 (N.D. Cal. 1994).
230. Id. at 680.
231. Frank Music Corp. v. CompuServe, Inc., 93 Civ. 8153 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).
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approximately 140 music publishers filed suit against CompuServe.
The suit was based on CompuServe's circulation of music files
uploaded to CompuServe by individual subscribers. Industry insiders
fear that unless the threat of contributory infringement suits is
quelled soon, a fundamental reassessment of the on-line service trade
may be requiredP 2 This fear of contributory infringement suits may
result in greater on-line monitoring of subscribers, as well as
increased fees to offset potential legal costs.
However, a more recent case runs contrary to the Playboy233 and
Sega234 decisions. In Religious Technology Center v. Netcom On-
Line Communication Services, Inc.,235 Religious Technology Center
(RTC) owned the copyrights in the unpublished and published works
of L. Ron Hubbard, the late founder of the Church of Scientology.
One of the defendants, Dennis Erlich, posted portions of RTC's
works on an Internet newsgroupu 6 through a BBS that was connected
to the Internet via Netcom.3 7 After failing to convince Erlich to stop
his postings, RTC contacted Netcom and the BBS operator. Both
refused RTC's request to keep Erlich off their system. RTC then
brought an infringement action against the operator of the BBS and
Netcom, seeking to hold the defendants liable for copyright
infringement committed by Erlich.
The District Court held that that RTC raised a genuine issue of
fact regarding whether Netcom should have known that Erlich was
infringing their copyrights after receiving notice, whether Netcom
substantially participated in the infringement, and whether Netcom
has a valid fair use defense.231 Therefore, Netcom was not entitled to
summary judgment on RTC's claim of contributory copyright
infringement.239 However, RTC's claims of direct and vicarious
infringement did fail.m In addition, the court found that the BBS
operator was not liable on the theories of direct infringement or
vicarious liability, but that RTC's allegations were sufficient to raise
232. Cavazos, supra note 216, at 56.
233. Playboy, 839 F. Supp. at 1552.
234. Sega, 857 F. Supp. at 679.
235. Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Communication Servs., Inc., 907 F. Supp.
1361 (N.D. Cal. 1995).
236. The Usenet newsgroup alt.religion.scientology, is an on-line forum for discussion
and criticism of Scientology. Erlich was a former minister of Scientology turned vocal critic.
237. Netcom is a large Internet Service Provider (ISP).
238. Religious Tech. Ctr., 907 F. Supp. at 1381.
239. Id.
240. Id.
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the issue of contributory infringement. 241
The court found that neither Playboy nor Sega required finding
Netcom liable for direct infringement of RTC's exclusive right to
reproduce its work. The court held "the storage on a defendant's
system of infringing copies and retransmission to other servers is not
a direct infringement by the BBS operator of the exclusive right to
reproduce the work where such copies are uploaded by an infringing
user. Playboy does not hold otherwise." 242 The court also mentioned
that:
to the extent that Sega holds that BBS operators are directly liable
for copyright infringement when users upload infringing works to
their systems, this court respectfully disagrees with the court's
holding for the reasons discussed above [distinguishing Playboy
and Sega on the facts and discussing the requirement of some
element of volition or causation which the court found lacking
where a defendant's system is merely used to create a copy by a
third party.]243
The best evidence that the court understood the magnitude of the
problem associated with trying to determine the copyright status of
on-line information sent across the Internet is the court's statement
that:
Where the infringing subscriber is clearly directly liable for the
same act, it does not make sense to adopt a rule that could lead to
the liability of countless parties whose role in the infringement is
nothing more than setting up and operating a system that is
necessary for the functioning of the Internet .... The court does
not find workable a theory of infringement that would hold the
entire Internet liable for activities that cannot reasonably be
deterred. Billions of bits of data flow through the Internet and are
necessarily stored on servers throughoutthe network and it is thus
practically impossible to screen out infringing bits from
noninfringing bits.244
B. Privacy
The issue of privacy is fundamental to the on-line community,
and is one area where the use of encryption will have the greatest
241. Id. at 1381-82.
242. Id. at 1370-71.
243. Id. at 1371 n.17.
244. Id. at 1372-73. See also Julie E. Cohen, A Right to Read Anonymously: A Closer
Look at "Copyright Management" in Cyberspace, 28 CONN. L. REv. 981 (1996).
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effect. At common law, aprimafacie case of a wrongful invasion of
privacy requires proof of an intentional or negligent and highly
offensive intrusion by the defendant into the plaintiffs private life,
and causation.245 The effects of the strong security brought about by
IPng and encryption will play an important privacy role in the future.
Because of the wide-reaching effects of privacy regulations, the
growth of the Internet has raised both statutory and common law
privacy questions. The Electronic Communications Privacy Act of
1986 (ECPA)246 prohibits anyone but the sender or the intended
recipient from reading an intercepted e-mail. Any further disclosure
or use of the content of the message by any party, other then the
message sender and its intended recipient, is prohibited if the
intercepting party knows or has reason to know that the message was
illegally intercepted.247 However, the ECPA's details have yet to be
completely sorted out. Some questions, such as what qualifies as
intercepting e-mail, are still being litigated in court.248 According to
one decision, it is not interception when e-mail that is sitting, unread,
in a user's mailbox (but no longer in transit) is seized and read.249
Similarly, common law privacy doctrines take on a whole new
life in the Internet.210 Lawsuits based on public disclosure of private
facts and false light invasions of privacy, for example, may become
much more common in those states that recognize them.251 Attorneys
faced with novel and unprecedented fact patterns involving computer
networks or on-line services will likely try to mold these and similar
privacy claims to adapt them to the new, digital environment where
the underlying dispute developed. 252
C. Defamation
Along with the growing popularity of the Internet has come the
ability to send uncensored messages to vast numbers of people at
245. See, e.g., Hamberger v. Eastman, 206 A.2d 239 (N.H. 1964).
246. Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2510 (1988).
247. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1)(a) and (4).
248. Cavazos, supra note 216, at 56.
249. See Steve Jackson Games, Inc. v. United States Secret Service, 36 F.3d 457 (5th Cir.
1994). Note that the U.S. Secret Service was found guilty of violating the ECPA (on the stored
part of the Act rather than the interception part), and paid a thousand dollars in statutory
damages to each of the two people who had joined in the suit on the grounds that their mail
had been read.
250. Cavazos, supra note 216, at 57.
251. Id.
252. Id.
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little to no cost. Inevitably, there are people who abuse this
newfound communications resource. At common law, a prima facie
case of defamation requires the publication to some third person of a
statement that harms the reputation of the plaintiff, thereby causing
the plaintiff to suffer damages.53
One of the main problems that arises when dealing with on-line
defamation cases is assessing the liability for on-line service bureaus
or BBS operators when a user of the system is the one responsible for
the defamatory message.2s4 In Cubby, Inc. v. CompuServe Inc.,2 5
CompuServe was able to defeat a defamation lawsuit on First
Amendment grounds by showing that it was unaware of the existence
of the message at issue. The court held that CompuServe was in
essence an electronic for profit library, and as such, there was little or
no editorial control.2s6  Because of strong First Amendment
considerations, the appropriate standard of liability was whether
CompuServe knew or had reason to know of the defamatory
statement.57
In a similar case, a New York court held that the Delphi
computer on-line service bureau was to be treated as a news
disseminator in a suit brought by Howard Stem. The court dismissed
allegations that Delphi's use of his name and photograph violated the
New York Civil Rights Law.2 8
However, the CubbyA9 holding might not apply when a
computer system's operators actively exert editorial control over the
content of public discussions.260 In the recent case Stratton Oakmont,
Inc. v. Prodigy Services Company,261 Prodigy faced a $200 million
libel suit by a Long Island based securities firm, Stratton Oakmont,
Inc., alleging that inaccurate comments made in Prodigy's financial
discussion forums caused the firm $200 million in damages. The key
differences separating this case from Cubb 2 62 were: (1) Prodigy held
itself out as controlling its content and (2) Prodigy also implemented
253. See, e.g., Romaine v. Kallinger, 537 A.2d 284 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1988).
254. Cavazos, supra note 216, at 54.
255. Cubby, Inc. v. CompuServe Inc., 776 F. Supp. 135 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
256. Id. at 139.
257. Id. at 140.
258. Stem v. Delphi Internet Servs. Corp., 165 Misc. 2d 21, (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1995).
259. Cubby, 776 F. Supp. at 135.
260. Cavazos, supra note 216, at 56.
261. Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Servs. Co., No. 31063/94, 1995 WL 323710,
(N.Y.Sup. May 24, 1995).
262. Cubby, 776 F. Supp. at 135.
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control through software screening programs and board leaders.263
The court agreed with Stratton Oakmont and held that Prodigy was
exercising editorial control.264 Therefore, Prodigy was equated with a
publisher, and thus was liable for the electronic posts, if they were, in
fact, defamation.
However, shortly after that ruling, Stratton Oakmont agreed to
drop its suit against Prodigy, in return for Prodigy saying it was
sorry.265 Prodigy said it was sorry that Stratton Oakmont was hurt,
but did not say it was responsible.266
VI. FUTURE INTERNET SECURITY STANDARDS
The Internet is a continually evolving system. One of its
greatest strengths is its ability to change and adapt to new challenges.
The problems that the Internet currently faces have prompted a host
of recommendations for modifications to the Internet. This comment
focuses primarily on one such future modification, IPng.
A. IPng Overview
IPng is a new version of the Internet Protocol (IP), designed as a
successor to IP version 4, the current version of IP used on the
Internet.267 IPng has been assigned IP version number 6 and is also
referred to as IPv6. The IETF (Internet Engineering Task Force)268
hopes to upgrade the Internet to IPng during the next two to six years.
IPng was designed to take an evolutionary step forward from IPv4.269
It was not designed to make a radical leap away from IPv4.
Functions which work in IPv4 were retained in IPng, and ineffective
functions were eliminated. Because of the explosive growth of the
263. Stratton Oakmont, 1995 WL 32371, at 4.
264. Id.
265. Peter H. Lewis, After Apology From Prodigy. Firm Drops Suit, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 25,
1995, at D1.
266. Id.
267. Hinden, supra note 20.
268. The IETF is a large, open international community of network designers, operators,
vendors and researchers whose purpose is to coordinate the operation, management, and
evolution of the Internet and to resolve short- and mid-range protocol and architectural issues.
It is a major source of proposals for protocol standards which are submitted to the Internet
Architecture Board (lAB) for final approval. The IETF meets three times a year and extensive
minutes are included in the IETF Proceedings. The IETF Secretariat, run by The Corporation
for National Research Initiatives with funding from the U.S. government, maintains an index
of Intemet-Drafts whereas RFCs (Requests For Comment) are maintained by The Internet
Architecture Board.
269. Hinden, supra note 20.
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Internet, IPng will be the future of the Internet, if only for the
expanded routing and addressing capabilities that it provides (the
current version of IP is quickly running out of address space). 20 The
changes from IPv4 to IPng fall primarily into the following
categories: 271 Expanded Routing and Addressing Capabilities; 272
Header Format Simplification;2 73 Improved Support for Options;274
Quality-of-Service Capabilities; 275 and most importantly for the
purposes of this paper, Authentication and Privacy Capabilities.2 76
B. IPng Security Mechanisms
The current Internet lacks effective privacy and authentication
mechanisms below the applications layer 277 and has a number of
270. The current version of IP uses a 32-bit address size providing 23 (approximately 4.3
billion) possible unique Internet addresses. The problem is not that the Internet is too big, for
the number of users is still less than one percent of the number of potential addresses. Instead,
inefficient allocation of addresses has caused most of the problem. A large number of people
have locked up vast sections of address space that they think they may want to eventually use.
While there may be other, more complicated alternatives, the new 128-bit address size of IPng
(2"' possible Internet addresses) will directly help solve this problem. Id.
271. Id.
272. IPng increases the IP address size from 32 bits to 128 bits, to support more levels of
addressing hierarchy and a much greater number of addressable nodes, as well as simpler auto-
configuration of addresses. Id.
273. Some IPv4 header fields (a small part of data added to the beginning of an IPng
datagram that provides important information about the datagram, such as destination address,
source address, etc.) have been dropped or made optional, to reduce the common-case
processing cost of packet handling and to keep the bandwidth cost (this refers to the drain on
the available throughput of the network as a whole) of the IPng header as low as possible
despite the increased size of the addresses. Id.
274. Changes in the way IP header options are encoded allows for more efficient
forwarding, less stringent limits on the length of options, and greater flexibility for introducing
new options in the future. Id.
275. A new capability is added to enable the labeling of packets belonging to particular
traffic "flows" for which the sender requests special handling, such as non-default quality of
service or "real-time" service. Id.
276. IPng includes the definition of extensions that provide support for authentication,
data integrity, and confidentiality. This is included as a basic element of IPng and will be
included in all implementations. Id.
277. The OSI (Open Systems Interconnect) Reference Model of network architecture and
a suite of protocols (protocol stack) to implement it were developed by the ISO (International
Organization for Standardization) in 1978 as a framework for international standards in
heterogeneous computer network architecture. The architecture is split between seven layers,
from lowest to highest: (1) physical layer, (2) datalink layer, (3) network layer (e.g., IP), (4)
transport layer (e.g., TCP), (5) session layer, (6) presentation layer, and (7) application layer.
Each layer uses the layer immediately below it and provides a service to the layer above.
Security is usually handled today at the higher levels, but IPng will transfer most of the
security dirty work down to the lower intermediary levels. The advantages of this are that by
moving the security down to a lower level, everything at the higher level (e.g., all applications
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other security problems. IPng remedies these shortcomings by
having two integrated options that provide security services. 278 These
two options may be used independently or in conjunction to provide
differing levels of security for different users. The first is the
Authentication Header that provides integrity and authentication
without confidentiality.279 The second is the Encapsulating Security
Payload which, depending on algorithm and mode, might provide
integrity and authentication but will always provide confidentiality. 280
1. IPng Authentication Header
The IPng Authentication Header seeks to provide integrity and
authentication for IPng datagrams.281 It accomplishes this by
computing a cryptographic authentication function over the entire
IPng datagram (including the address header, but minus any fields
that would change in transit) and using a secret authentication key in
the computation. The sender computes the authentication data just
prior to sending the authenticated JPng packet, and the receiver
verifies the correctness of the authentication data upon receipt. Non-
repudiation might be provided by some authentication algorithms
used with the Authentication Header.2 2 This is not necessarily
provided by all authentication algorithms that might be used with the
Authentication Header.283
If a symmetrically authenticated algorithm is used, and an
intermediate authentication is desired, then the systems performing
such a function would need to be provided with the appropriate
keys. 284 Possession of those keys would permit any one of those
systems to forge data claiming to be from the legitimate sender to the
that run at the application layer) can take advantage of the security functionality offered by the
lower level. Thus, security will be uniform across all applications that wish to take fill
advantage of IPng, and not application-specific. Savage, supra note 50, at 199-200.
278. Hinden, supra note 20.
279. Id.
280. Id.
281. R. Atkinson, LP Authentication Header RFC 1826 (visited Aug. 10, 1995)
<ftp://ds.intemic.netlrfc/rfcl826.txt>.
282. E.g., asymmetric algorithms like RSA when both sender and receiver keys are used
in the authentication calculation.
283. The default authentication algorithm is keyed MD5. Keyed MD5 is a popular
symmetric message digest algorithm. The sender computes the authentication data when the
datagram is sent, bised on the information contained in the datagram. When the packet is
received, the receiver independently performs the same function on it, and if the authentication
data matches, the datagram is authentic. However, because it is a symmetric algorithm, it
cannot provide non-repudiation. RSA LABORATORIES, supra note 82, at 79.
284. Atkinson, supra note 19, at 2.
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legitimate receiver or to modify the contents of otherwise legitimate
traffic. However, if an asymmetrically authenticated algorithm is
used and the intermediate systems are aware of the appropriate public
keys and authentication algorithm, then the systems possessing the
authentication public key could authenticate the traffic being handled
without being able to forge or modify the data traffic.
The Authentication Header provides much stronger security than
that which exists in most of the current Internet applications and
should not affect exportability or significantly increase
implementation cost.2 5 While the Authentication Header might be
implemented by a security gateway,2 6 on behalf of hosts on a trusted
network behind that security gateway, this mode of operation is not
encouraged. 2 7 Instead, the Authentication Header should be used
from origin to final destination, in order to guarantee the level of
security from computer to computer.
All IPng-capable hosts must implement the IPng Authentication
Header with at least the MD5 algorithm using a 128-bit key.288 Other
authentication algorithms may be implemented in addition to keyed
MD5. While the IPng Authentication Header is algorithm-
independent and will support many different authentication
techniques, the use of keyed MD5 is proposed to help ensure
interoperability within the worldwide Internet.289
The IPng Authentication Header can be used to eliminate a
significant class of network attacks, including IP spoofing attacks. 290
Its placement at a low OSI layer291 can help provide host origin
authentication to those upper layer protocols and services that
currently lack meaningful protection. This mechanism should be
exportable by vendors in the United States and other countries with
similar export restrictions292 because it only provides authentication
and integrity and not confidentiality. The exportability of the IPng
Authentication Header encourages its widespread deployment and
285. Id. at 8.
286. A security gateway is a system that acts as the communications gateway between
external untrusted systems and trusted hosts on their own subnetwork and provides security
services for the trusted hosts when they communicate with external untrusted system.
287. Atkinson, supra note 281, at 10.
288. Id.
289. Keyed MD5 is well known, and is already widely used today. RSA LABORATORIES,
supra note 82, at 69, 79.
290. Atkinson, supra note 19, at 11.
291. See supra note 277.
292. See infra Part V.A (for a discussion of export restrictions).
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2. IPng Encapsulating Security Payload
The IPng Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) seeks to
provide integrity, authentication, and confidentiality to IPng
datagrams.293 It does this by encapsulating either an entire IPng
datagram or only the upper-layer protocol 294 data inside the ESP,
encrypting most of the ESP contents, and then appending a new
cleartext IPng header to the now encrypted Encapsulating Security
Payload. This cleartext IPng header is used to carry the protected
data through the Internet. The recipient of the cleartext datagram
removes and discards the cleartext IPng header and cleartext IPng
options, decrypts the ESP, processes and then removes the ESP
headers, and then processes the (now decrypted) original IPng
datagram or upper-layer protocol data as per the normal IPng
protocol specifications.295
ESP works between hosts, between a host and a security
gateway, or between security gateways.296 This support for security
gateways permits trustworthy networks to omit encryption and
thereby avoid the performance and monetary costs of encryption,
while still providing confidentiality for traffic transiting
untrustworthy network segments. The use of ESP can be fine tuned
to reduce both the bandwidth consumed and the protocol processing
costs for users that do not need to keep the entire IPng datagram
confidential.
For interoperability throughout the worldwide Internet, all
conforming implementations of IPng Encapsulating Security Payload
must support the use of DES.297 Other confidentiality algorithms and
modes may also be implemented in addition to this mandatory
algorithm and mode. This flexibility is necessary because of the
current export restrictions placed on encryption technology.298
293. R. Atkinson, LP Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) RFC 1827 (visited Aug. 10
1995) < ftp://ds.intemic.netrfc/rfc1827.txt>.
294. For example, TCP (Transmission Control Protocol), the common delivery protocol
for use with IP that is responsible for making sure that the data gets through the network to the
receiver. TCP resides one level higher than IP, but still on the intermediary (Internet) level.
TCP and IP work together (they are often referred to together as TCP/IP) to package the data
into a packet and makes sure that packet ends up where it is supposed to. See also supra note
277 for a summary of the different levels and supra note 55 for a definition of a packet.
295. Atkinson, supra note 19, at 9.
296. Id. at 3.
297. Id. at 9.
298. See supra Part W.A.
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3. Combining IPng Security Mechanisms
In some cases, the IPng Authentication Header might be
combined with the IPng Encapsulating Security Protocol to obtain
the desired security properties.299 The Authentication Header always
provides integrity and authentication and can provide non-
repudiation if used with certain authentication algorithms (e.g.,
RSA). The Encapsulating Security Payload always provides integrity
and confidentiality and can also provide authentication if used with
certain authenticating encryption algorithms. Adding the
Authentication Header to an IPng datagram prior to encapsulating
that datagram using the Encapsulating Security Protocol might be
desirable for users wishing to have strong integrity, authentication,
confidentiality, and perhaps also nonrepudiation.
C. IPng Key Management
For flexibility reasons, the IPng specifications do not list a
specific key management protocol.300 The key management protocol
is coupled to the other security mechanisms only via the Security
Association Identifier (SAID).301 IPng is not intended to support so-
called "in-band" key management, where the key management data is
carried in a distinct IPng header. Instead it will primarily use "out-
of-band" key management, where the key management data will be
carried out by an upper layer protocol.302  This permits clear
decoupling of the key management mechanism from the other
security mechanisms, and thereby permits an individual or a system
to substitute new and improved key management methods without
having to modify the implementations of the other security
mechanisms. This is clearly advisable given the long history of
subtle flaws in published key management protocols. 30
3
There are a number of key management algorithms that have
been described in the public literature,3°4 and widespread deployment
299. Atkinson, supra note 293, at 1.
300. Id. at 2.
301. The Security Association is the set of security information relating to a given
network connection or set of connections. This usually includes the cryptographic key, key
lifetime, algorithm, algorithm mode, sensitivity level (e.g., Unclassified, Secret, Proprietary),
what kind of security service is provided (authentication-only, what level of encryption, or
some combination), and possibly other data. Atkinson, supra note 19, at 2.
302. See supra note 277 (for a discussion of upper layer protocols).
303. R. M. Needham and M. D. Schroeder, Using Encryptionfor Authentication in Large
Netvorks of Computers, 21 COMM's ACM 993 (1978).
304. Needham & Schroeder have proposed a key management algorithm that relies on a
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and use of IPng security will require an Internet-standard scaleable
key management protocol. Ideally such a protocol would support a
number of protocols, not just IPng security. There is work underway
within the IETF to add signed host keys to the Domain Name
System. 305 The DNS keys enable the originating party to authenticate
key management messages with the other key management party
using an asymmetric algorithm, such as RSA. The two parties would
then have an authenticable communications channel that could be
used to create a shared session key using Diffie-Hellman or other
means.
306
D. IPng Security Weaknesses
Users need to understand that the quality of the security
provided by IPng depends completely on the strength of the
cryptographic algorithms implemented, the strength of the key being
used, a correct implementation of the cryptographic algorithms, the
security of the key management protocol, the correct implementation
of IPng, and the several security mechanisms in all of the
participating systems. 307 The security of the implementation is, in
part, related to the security of the operating system that embodies the
security implementations. 3 8
Certain security properties like traffic analysis protection are not
provided by any of the security mechanisms described above.309 It is
unclear whether meaningful protection from traffic analysis can be
provided economically at the Internet Layer, and it appears that few
Internet users are concerned about traffic analysis. A traditional
centralized key distribution system. Id.
Diffie and Heilman have devised an algorithm that does not require a centralized key
distribution system. Whitfield. Diffie and Martin E.. Hellman, New Directions In
Cryptography, 22 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON INFO. THEORY, 644, 647-48 (1976). While this
technique is vulnerable to certain types of attacks, this weakness can be mitigated by using a
digital signature to authentically bootstrap into a Diffle-Hellman exchange. BRUCE SCHNEIER,
APPLIED CRYPTOGRAPHY (1994).
305. See supra note 100 for more information on Domain Name System (DNS).
306. Id.
307. For example, if the operating system does not keep the private cryptologic keys
confidential, then traffic using those keys will not be secure. If any of these factors are
incorrect or insufficiently secure, little or no real security will be provided to the user.
Because different users on the same system might not trust each other, each user or each
session should usually be keyed separately.
308. Atkinson, supra note 19, at 10-11.
309. Traffic analysis is a kind of network attack where the adversary is able to make
useful deductions just by analyzing the network traffic patterns (such as frequency of
transmission, who is talking with whom, size of packets, etc.). Atkinson, supra note 19, at 10.
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method for protection against traffic analysis is the use of bulk link
encryption. Other techniques include sending false traffic in order to
increase the noise in the data provided by traffic analysis, and the use
of anonymous remailers3t 0 to disguise the source.31'
E. Other Future Internet Security Standards
At present, there is a rush toward a standard that would govern
electronic retail transactions over the Internet, regardless of whether
the security is handled at the application level, or at a lower level
(such as with IPng).312 The two main competing standards for
encrypting communications over the Internet are Netscape's Secure
Sockets Layer (SSL) 313 and Microsoft's Private Communications
Technology (PCT).314  Recently, both companies set aside their
differences to work together on defining a single security standard
called the Secure Transport Layer Protocol (STLP). 3 5  STLP
combines features of both SSL and PCT, and could eliminate the
possibility of having two competitive standards for Internet security.
In addition to these two main competitors, there are a variety of other
proposed Internet protocols. 316
Both Netscape and Microsoft accomplish their goals of privacy,
authentication, and data integrity in much the same way. Both use
protocols (Netscape uses (SSL) and Microsoft uses (PCT)) that are
application protocol-independent and allow for a "higher level"
application protocol to be layered on top transparently. SSL and PCT
work similarly by beginning with a handshake phase that negotiates
an encryption algorithm and session key as well as authenticating a
server to the client, based on certified asymmetric public keys. Once
310. Anonymous remailers take an incoming e-mail message that contains a true
destination address and strip all header and option information (including the source address),
and remail it to the true destination address with a new random name and the source address of
the remailer. Because of their ease of use, anonymous remailers are considered the best choice
for personal e-mail.
311. See Atkinson, supra note 19, at 17.
312. Once IPng becomes widespread, it will mitigate the need for Internet security to be
done solely at the application layer, but solutions are still needed today.
313. Elinor Mills, Netscape, Mastercard propose Internet payment standard,
INFoWORLD, Nov. 17, 1995, at 1.
314. Id.
315. Karen Rodriguez, Dueling Developers Agree to Cooperate,
COMMUNICATIONSWEEK., Apr. 15, 1996.
316. One other popular security protocol is SKIP (Simple Key management for Internet
Protocols). SKIP secures IP network communications using IETF standard protocols and is
promoted by Sun Microsystems.
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transmission of application protocol data begins, all data is encrypted
using the session key negotiated during the handshake. PCT
enhances SSL by separating authentication from encryption. This
means that PCT allows applications to use authentication that is
significantly stronger than the 40-bit key limit for encryption allowed
by the U.S. government for export. However, Netscape claims that
unlike SSL, PCT is not vendor-neutral and non-proprietary, which
are important qualities necessary to becoming an industry standard.
VII. LEGAL ISSUES RESOLVED & CREATED
The promise of full implementation of IPng is still distant.
However, once IPng establishes itself as the standard protocol on the
Internet, it will provide solutions to several of the problems afflicting
the current Internet. IPng's built-in, transparent support for
authentication, data integrity, and confidentiality, combined with the
use of strong encryption, will lessen considerably several of the
current security concerns. IPng is the perfect vehicle for
implementing ubiquitous strong encryption technology. Native
encryption will allow all forms of data to be quickly and securely
encrypted. This new security will have a serious effect on how
people interact on the Internet. Certain old problems will disappear,
but new ones will take their place.
The effect of encryption on computer crime and fraud is clear -
encryption will be used by companies and individuals to defend
themselves against computer criminals. Given widespread use of
encryption, crimes of this sort should drop dramatically, as would-be
criminals find it difficult to hack their way into encrypted systems
and realize the futility of stealing encrypted information. However,
while encryption is clearly advantageous to helping prevent these
types of crimes, it may have the opposite effect on certain
noncomputer crimes.
A. Solutions to Current Problems
Active attacks are now widely known to exist on the Internet. 317
The presence of active attacks means that unauthenticated source
routing,318 either unidirectional (receive-only) or with replies
following the original received source route, represents a significant
317. Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT), supra note 74.
318. Source routing means that the information was "routed"- sent by a router, which is
a system that receives packets from one local network and forwards on those packets that are
destined for a source outside the local network.
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security risk unless all received source routed packets are
authenticated using the IP Authentication Header.319 Because all
IPng-capable hosts must implement the IPng Authentication Header
with at least the keyed MD5 algorithm using a 128-bit key, this will
directly solve the problem of e-mail tampering, IP spoofing, and
other common hacker computer tactics. 320  The Authentication
Header will contain the true information sent by the sender, including
the true sender's address. Validation of sent information will
virtually eliminate e-mail forgeries.32' The ability to determine the
true address of a sender foils common techniques for hacking into a
remote computer system -most hacking schemes involve tricking a
computer into thinking the intruder is actually a trusted system.32
Thus, the problems caused by hackers trying to gain access to
computer systems will be greatly diminished after IPng3  but not
completely eradicated - hackers are notoriously clever and
resourceful people.
Companies that have shied away from the Internet because of
security concerns will begin to set up connections because of the
pervasive security cryptography will provide.324 Commerce on the
Internet will flourish because of the authenticated, secure
transactional links between merchants, customers, and banks.315
After years of waiting for the Internet revolution to happen, on-line
products and services merchants will finally provide a convenient
and secure method of home shopping to the general public.326 All
manner of new products and services, ranging from on-line real-time
video dating to custom tailored clothing and music CDs will appear.
Digital cash,327 with its strong privacy, will become a popular new
319. Atkinson, supra note 19, at 7-8.
320. Id. at 8.
321. Note, however, that this is still dependent on not allowing access to other people's
accounts. See infra Part VII.C (discussing "human" security problems).
322. See supra Part III.B.
323. It is unlikely to be completely eradicated; hackers are notoriously clever and
resourceful.
324. From Wire Reports, supra note 8. See also Rich Santalesa, Feeling Safe and Sound
Online, COMPUTER SHOPPER, Oct. 1995.
325. Bob Metcalfe, A penny for my thoughts is more than I could hope for on the next
Internet, INFOWORLD, Jan. 22, 1996, at 81 (discussing how secure on-line transactions will
stimulate growth in on-line markets for intellectual property, especially newspaper columns
and component software).
326. For a discussion of the legal issues that these electronic commerce contracts will
create, see Raymond T. Nimmer, Electronic Contracting: Legal Issues, 14 J. MARSHALL J.
COMPUTER& INFO. L. 211 (1996).
327. There are several companies (e.g., DigiCash and CyberCash) that are developing a
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method of payment, particularly convenient for purchasing things




The native authentication and encryption of IPng may increase
copyright infringement over the Internet. This would be due to the
strong privacy associated with IPng. Strong privacy would enable
software pirates to disseminate illegally copied software without fear
of being detected while transferring the file (there would be no way
for a third party (including an on-line service bureau) to know what
was contained in the encrypted file). On the other hand, if upon its
receipt, the authorities somehow decrypted the file and found it to be
infringing, they could then discover the true sender's address via
IPng's authentication mechanism and prosecute him with this
evidence.3 29
While encryption may increase the spread of copyright
infringement, it will do little to aid on-line service providers avoid
third-party liability under the Playboy330 holding. That case probably
would not have been decided differently even if the Playboy pictures
posted to Frena's BBS had been encrypted. It is true that while
authentication would have allowed authorities to determine the true
sender, encryption would have precluded Frena from having any
knowledge whatsoever of the contents of the posted information.
Therefore, there would have been no way for Frena to have known
that the pictures posted violated Playboy's copyright. However,
Playboy's holding that intent or knowledge is not an element of
infringement makes it unlikely that the use of encryption would have
affected the outcome. On the other hand, the use of encryption
would bolster Religious Technology Center's31 ruling that it is
"practically impossible to screen out infringing bits from
noninfringing bits. '332
Proposals for substantial changes to the Copyright Act currently
scheme for digital cash whereby you can make payments that neither your bank nor outside
observers can trace (unlike conventional credit card transactions). See Santalesa, supra note
324.
328. Even though digital cash is gaining momentum, it is likely to be several years before
novice users can easily and securely e-mail money across the Internet. Id.
329. What protection the Fourth Amendment provides for encrypted messages sent across
insecure communication lines is unclear..
330. Playboy, 839 F. Supp. at 1552.
331. Religious Tech. Ctr.,907 F. Supp. at 1361.
332. Id. at 1370-71.
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exist. Present copyright law principles relating to third party
liability, which have been developed to apply to the use of analog
works (e.g., books, movies, records, etc.) are a poor fit for the digital
Internet. As the "NI Copyright Protection Act of 1995" (S.
1284/H.R. 2441) stands, it would continue to impose third-party
liability on on-line service providers3 33 Since service providers
would be called upon to identify and stop subscribers' infringing
activities, they would have to monitor all activities, at whatever cost
to the privacy interests of all who rely on Internet communications.
The NII Copyright Protection Act of 1995 would also encourage
the use of encryption to give copyright owners total control over
electronic distribution of their works, without regard to any other
policies in the Act. The current legislative proposal over-emphasizes
the commercial exploitation of individual works by giving the
owners of those works complete control over their electronic
distribution. Currently, copyright holders have exclusive control
over the initial distribution of their work 34 However, once they do
decide to make their works available, their rights are restricted by
other elements of the law. Under the current Copyright Act, these
sections include the doctrines of "fair use '335 and of "first sale"336 and
the limited exemptions granted to, among others, libraries and
educators.337 The bill's expansion of the distribution right to include
transmissions,338 combined with the development of systems for the
encryption and licensing of electronic works,3 9 essentially eliminates
the limitations on the rights of copyright owners and gives them
complete control. They would have control over the original
333. It should be noted that in the latest working version of the bill, significant changes
were made, including language to limit on-line service provider liability. However, it has been
reported that the bill has been indefinitely postponed. See Dan Goodin, World LP Summit
Opens Under Cloud, RECORDER, Dec. 2, 1996, at 1.
334. See Harper & Row Publishers v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 551 (1985).
335. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1988).
336. 17 U.S.C. § 109 (1988).
337. 17 U.S.C. § 108 (1988).
338. 17 U.S.C. § 106(3) (1988) governs the distribution rights of copyright holders, and
currently does not list any transmission rights.
339. It should be noted that such encryption systems to regulate intellectual property over
the Internet are already becoming available. IBM recently announced the commercial
availability of "Cryptolope" containers. Cryptolopes are secure packaging for digital
information, enabling Internet users to buy and sell content securely over the Internet.
Cryptolopes work as follows: once targeted information is found, commercial content will be
delivered in Cryptolope containers, accompanied by a content abstract. After the user has
decided to open the contents of the container, a transparent digital key is issued, and the user is
able to "open" the Cryptolope.
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decision to distribute, and all subsequent distributions as well. The
use of IPng to encrypt copyrighted works would allow publishers to
have precise control over the distribution of their copyrighted
material.
This change to the Copyright Act would cause a radical change
of the current Internet "library" model of shared resources. The
Internet would move toward a completely commercial
"superdistribution" model 40  In practice, this will mean that a
publisher could charge for every use of even the smallest element of
a work, including even looking up a word in a dictionary. This
would be akin to treating a father who sends his child newspaper
clippings in the mail as a copyright infringer. As such, this new
model could have dramatic effects on the use of the Internet- those
who can afford to pay will get the information they want, while those
who cannot afford to pay will be left out.341
2. Privacy
Widespread use of encryption in IPng also raises serious
questions of privacy. Taking the previous example of a
"superdistribution" model to copyrighted material distribution, these
copyright distribution systems will require the development of a
mechanism to track every use of a particular work, together with a
system to charge individual readers for whatever they use. Such a
system may require a huge database that tracks the reading habits of
every American who uses the Internet. Many Americans will be
troubled by the existence of such a database, likely considering it an
unwarranted intrusion on their privacy that will have a chilling effect
on what they choose to read.
The use of IPng will both decrease and increase the privacy of
users. The use of authentication means that users who currently send
e-mail or post information under a false name will lose a certain
degree of privacy. Through IPng's authentication, their
340. In such a "superdistribution" model, a customer would be allowed to forward the
encrypted copyrighted material to others who may be interested in its contents, thus facilitating
the first phase of superdistribution. Publishers can now take advantage of the Internet as a
business medium by which to sell their information, over and over again.
341. It should be noted that the recent WIPO (World Intellectual Property Organization)
treaty extending copyright protection to the Internet would prohibit reverse engineering and
cryptanalysis through provisions against the circumvention of anti-copy electronic encryption
devices. See John Zarocostas, Copyright Treaties Extended to Internet, J. COMMERCE, Dec.
23, 1996, at 1A. The restrictions would make it illegal to try to break encryption systems,
which is an essential part of analyzing encryption systems to determine how they work. It
would also prevent the legitimate use of programs that attempt to recover lost passwords.
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transmissions will be traceable to their original source. At the same
time, users' privacy will increase with the use of encryption to
conceal messages from unwanted electronic eavesdroppers. This
increase in privacy will likely outweigh the tracing effects of
authentication for most people. The use of encryption will open up
the Internet to communications that were previously considered too
sensitive to be conducted over "public lines." For example, most law
offices currently forbid sending e-mail to clients containing
confidential information. With strong encryption in place, sending a
client confidential work product over the Internet would be as safe as
if the lawyer was talking to the client in his office.342
Native encryption will also reduce the problem of "casual"
interlopers. While the use of DES (the default encryption in IPng)
will not stand up to the determined hacker with the necessary time
and monetary resources, 343 the more common problem of someone
just randomly searching through e-mail for certain "interesting"
words will disappear. While DES is not impossible to crack with
today's computers, it still takes some time.34 Thus, it will probably
not be worth the potential intruder's time and effort to try to crack
everyone's e-mail just for the chance of finding something exciting
to read.34
E-mail forgeries (or even audio/visual impersonation) will
become more difficult to accomplish. It will be possible to track the
source of suspect files (company trade secrets, pornographic files,
etc.) sent across the Internet to the culprit. Users will be able to
authenticate any data, whether it is plain e-mail text or multimedia
audio/visual material, via the mechanisms in IPng as to its true
sender.346
342. Note that this is a case where strong encryption would be required. It would be
possible, and indeed given the right circumstances, profitable for an adversary to incept and
decrypt weakly encrypted communications.
343. Given an unlimited budget with which to purchase as many very powerful computers
as it takes and given enough time, it theoretically is possible to crack just about any encryption
scheme, although it could cost billions and take thousands of years. The only type of
algorithm guaranteed to be secure against all forms of mathematical and brute-force attacks is
known as the "one-time pad." A one-time pad is nothing more than a nonrepeating set of truly
random key letters. The sender uses each key letter on the pad to encrypt exactly one plaintext
character. The receiver has an identical pad and uses each key on the pad, in turn, to decrypt
each letter of the ciphertext. LANcE J. HoFFMAN, BUILDING IN BIG BROTHER 22 (1995).
344. See infra note 123.
345. Note that this is not limited to amateur hackers. Even if the NSA can easily crack
one message encrypted with DES, trying to crack every e-mail or other data transmission that
will now use DES built into IPng would be prohibitively costly.
346. Note the problems that would arise if some ISPs deliberately did not implement
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3. Defamation
The built-in authentication with IPng will make it much easier to
enforce the laws against certain computer crimes such as defamation.
For example, the problem of defamatory e-mails would be solved by
knowing the true sender's address (the IP source address that
identifies the machine where the message was sent) and the user
name contained in the unaltered e-mail itself. Note that if the two
pieces do not match, then this would point to a local security
problem, i.e., someone using someone else's computer account.
Presumably, the sender of a message will be less likely to publish
defamatory statements over the Internet once he realizes that his e-
mail can be authenticated and traced to him. IPng will make it
possible to authenticate any message to determine the machine of the
true sender.347
IPng's support for encryption will also have a strong effect on
the area of defamation. This is most evident in examining the
Cubby-38 and Stratton Oakmont 9 cases. In Cubby, the use of
encryption would greatly bolster CompuServe's assertion that it was
unaware of the existence of the questionable material. In fact, if the
person who had posted the defamatory message had encrypted it so
that only certain recipients could read it, there would be no possible
way for CompuServe to know that the message was defamatory.
However, in the Stratton Oakmont case, it is unlikely that the use of
encryption would have changed the result. In Stratton Oakmont,
Prodigy exercised editorial control over all posts and would
necessarily have had to have read the message (decrypted it) before it
was posted on-line.
B. Effect ofEncryption on the Courts and Law Enforcement
As the above examples show, IPng and its built-in encryption
will begin to have a major effect on the law as the technology
becomes more widely used. It is clear that data authentication will
greatly assist law enforcement in tracking down criminals in
cyberspace. Data authentication will increase the amount of
security precautions in order to make themselves attractive to customers who did not want
their data to be traceable.
347. Or at least the account from which it was sent. A human security problem can
prevent knowing the true sender if the account from which the data was sent was not secure.
See infra Part VII.C.
348. Cubby, 776 F. Supp. at 135.
349. Stratton Oalnont, 1995 WL 323710, at 4.
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computer output offered into evidence.3 50 The authentication process
for computer output is primarily addressed by Federal Rule of
Evidence 901(b)(9), which requires a description of the "process or
system used to produce a result" and a showing that it "produces an
accurate result." IPng's data authentication should easily satisfy this
standard.
I Strong encryption, however, presents both opportunities and
challenges. Encryption will help the courts by preventing many
crimes from happening in the first place. Strong Internet security is
the best defense to computer crime. Unfortunately, it is inevitable
that encryption will be used by criminals in the process of
committing a crime. This is the price to pay for having high security
for everyone. However, this does not mean that the battle with high-
tech criminals is lost. Data purposefully encrypted to conceal a
crime should be treated as just what it is - an obstruction of justice.
New laws specifically dealing with encryption used to conceal crimes
are unnecessary, since they would duplicate obstruction of justice
crimes that are already available to prosecutors.35 1 Such laws would
be unwise since they might be interpreted to discriminate against
users of encryption. There should be no legal difference between a
criminal flushing drugs down a toilet and a criminal encrypting
stolen credit card numbers before the police can complete a valid
search. Encryption of criminal data that could be used as evidence
by the prosecution should be prosecuted to the fullest extent of the
law.
It is also important to keep in mind that "criminal data," whether
it be pornographic images or unauthorized reproductions of
copyrighted works, does not stay encrypted. It starts out as plaintext
data, and at some point will end up somewhere as plaintext data.
After all, encrypted data does a criminal no good until he decrypts it.
It will become increasingly important to focus on those starting and
ending points of the data transmission. Police can intercept this
decrypted data at the starting or ending point just as easily as always.
Even communication interception (e.g., wiretapping) could be
accomplished by placing a listening device outside the end-to-end
350. See, e.g., United States v. Scholle, 553 F.2d 1109, 1123-24 (8th Cir. 1977) (computer
analysis on physical characteristics of drugs seized and tested throughout the coimtry). See
generally Jerome J. Roberts, A Practitioner's Primer on Computer-Generated Evidence, 41 U.
CRHL L. REV. 254 (1974); Comment, Litigators Byte the Apple: Utilizing Computer-Generated
Evidence at Trial, 41 BAYLOR L. REv. 731 (1989); Note, A Reconsideration of the
Admissibility of Computer Generated Evidence, 126 U. PA. L. REv. 425 (1977).
351. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 1501-17 (1988 & Supp. V. 1993).
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encryption stream, e.g., placing a listening device in the room of the
person receiving the data after it has been decrypted and put into
human-understandable form. Good, old-fashioned detective work
will be the key to solving cases dealing with encryption. Police can
still garner evidence during searches and from informants who turn
over decrypted criminal data to the police. These standard operating
procedures by police will continue to be useful in the future as law
enforcement learns to deal with crime over the Internet.
C. Other Future Problems
As powerful as IPng's security features are, security problems
will remain. Most of the problems will concern deliberate attempts
to circumvent the inherent security of IPng, or will result from
human error.352
One problem that will not go away with IPng will be the use of
anonymous remailers. 353 With an anonymous remailer, the true
sender's identity is kept secret. However, the anonymous remailer
still knows the sender's true name and source address. Whoever
controls the remailer could possibly be forced (via a court order) to
divulge the sender's true name and address. However, the remailer
could deliberately destroy all such information immediately after re-
sending the information. Also, if multiple chained remailers were
used (sending the e-mail from remailer to remailer several times
before it reaches its final destination), the court may be unable to
identify the proper party against which to act.354
Other problems that will arise with IPng include a severe
restriction on the ability of governments to tax. Anonymity through
remailers combined with reputation guaranteed by digital signatures
creates the possibility of an anonymous, yet reputable worker that the
IRS can not tax. Also, transactions conducted anonymously through
digital cash can make taxation difficult.
Several forms of legal regulation, like political censorship as
well as copyright law, become difficult to enforce with IPng. For
example, an anonymous vendor could sell pirated copies of software
352. People can, and will continue to accidentally reveal their secure passwords to others,
or simply allow others to use their accounts or gain access to secure systems. The fallible
human being will always be a weak link in the security chain.
353. The anonymous remailer "anon.penet.fi" is probably the most famous. After its legal
squabbles with the Church of Scientology, the Church ended up forcing the remailer to divulge
the true identity of one of its customers.
354. At present, there are only a handful of remailers, but there is no reason why there
could not be hundreds of them in the near future.
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over the Internet. More serious crimes, such as blackmail, the selling
of corporate secrets, and even hired assassins355 are also possible.
In addition, no matter what technological security features are
utilized, there will still be "human" security problems of people using
someone else's computer or computer account improperly. Social
engineering of people to trick them into breaching security is always
possible. Authentication of a source address does little good if it
traces back to a computer that has poor local security. For example,
by virtue of the IPng Authentication Header, it will be possible to
find the true sender of a harassing e-mail, but if the person associated
with sender's account has given out his password to others, it could
be difficult to determine who actually sent the e-mail using the
sender's account. Local security such as physical security (e.g.,
restricted access to servers), keystroke monitors that record all
activity at a computer, and strong passwords on computers and
network accounts will have to be in place and strictly followed, as the
chain of security is only as strong as its weakest link.
Finally, while computers that use IPng need to support the IPng
Authentication Header and the IPng Encapsulating Security Payload,
this does not mean that they are forced on the user. A user could
disable the security options, or use a completely different protocol to
get around using IPng.356 However, by attempting to make IPng such
a pervasive standard, and with the relative ease in which at least the
Authentication Header is implemented, this problem should be
minimized.
D. Fight Over Encryption
The present and future struggle over encryption pits the
government's desire to protect society from those who would use
encryption to commit crimes against the people's right to
confidentiality and privacy. While the government is not wrong in
trying to protect its citizens, it is currently doing more harm than
good by restricting encryption technology. Law enforcement should
355. It would be possible to imagine a workable system of assassins-for-hire across the
Internet. With the strong privacy on the future Internet, assassins could advertise
anonymously, communicate with their clients anonymously, and receive payment in digital
cash.
356. This major problem could be solved by requiring some minimum level of security
(e.g., at least the IPng Authentication Header using keyed MD5) in order to communicate with
the network you wish to keep secure (the routers could be configured to check for the
existence of the Authentication Header, and automatically discard any packet that does not
contain the field).
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not fear the widespread availability of encryption. In fact, they
should welcome and promote it. Encryption stops electronic thieves
by preventing unauthorized access to private data and computer
systems. The use of strong cryptography to protect computer
networks is becoming as natural and necessary as the use of locks
and burglar alarms to protect our homes and businesses. Eventually,
encryption will be ubiquitous. Although it is true that criminals
might occasionally derive some advantage from the use of
cryptography, the benefits of widely-available encryption technology
overwhelmingly favor the honest user.
As discussed above, there are legislative proposals that will
significantly impact the Internet. The single most important legal
change may occur in the deregulation of encryption technology. If
the current attempts357 to loosen the grasp the current export
regulations have on encryption technology are successful, then all of
the changes discussed in this comment are likely to occur much
faster. Government regulations have been the main stumbling block
preventing the use of strong encryption worldwide. With new pro-
encryption laws in place, companies will start to release strong
encryption versions of their software, which would in turn increase
consumer confidence in the security of the Internet. This would
result in opening up the Internet to commerce, and allow people to
feel safe that their private conversations and transactions remain
private.
Note that such legislation, while strongly supported by some, is
vehemently opposed by others. Law enforcement and national
security agencies want to keep encryption weak, or at least escrowed.
The pro-encryption bills will fail if a terrorist uses encryption to
conceal their plans and hinder prosecution. Public outcry over such
an incident would likely overcome rational thinking of the benefits of
encryption and doom pro-encryption forces.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The future of the Internet is clear. It must and will change from
its current patchwork of non-secure computers to a much more
secure, cohesive internetwork. IPng is one of the central
technologies that will shape the Internet in the years to come. IPng
will be forced upon the Internet because of its wild growth rate, and
along with it will come this new world of security. By virtue of its
357. See supra notes 192-193 and accompanying text.
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built-in security features, IPng will enable transparent data
authentication and encryption to all end users. The effects of this
inherent security will be felt by everyone. With this new level of
security comes both benefits and risks. How these risks will be
managed is still open to change by both the government and industry.
One thing is certain, however, and that is that increased security in
some form will be coming to the Internet very soon, and it will
change our paradigm of how we live, work, and play on the Internet.

